Running Newsticker for the War in Ukraine

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 5, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, March 5. This report analyzes the ongoing Battle for Bakhmut and Russian prospects for further offensive efforts. Ukrainian forces may be conducting a limited fighting withdrawal in eastern Bakhmut and are continuing to inflict high casualties against the advancing mixed Russian forces. Russian milbloggers have also lowered their expectations of Russian forces’ ability to launch additional offensives, which would likely culminate whether or not Russian forces actually capture Bakhmut. If Russian forces manage to secure Bakhmut they could then attempt renewed pushes towards one or both of Kostyantynivka or Slovyansk but would struggle with endemic personnel and equipment constraints. The likely imminent culmination of the Russian offensive around Bakhmut before or after its fall, the already culminated Russian offensive around Vuhledar, and the stalling Russian offensive in Luhansk Oblast are likely setting robust conditions for a future Ukrainian counteroffensive. . . .

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on March 5:

• 
  
  • The Ukrainian Air Force Command and Ukrainian news outlet Defense Express reported that Russian forces began using new UPAB-1500V aerial bombs against Ukrainian targets.[33]
  • Russian forces continued to conduct limited ground attacks northwest and south of Kreminna.[34]
  • Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks near Avdiivka and on the western outskirts of Donetsk City.[35] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced to Pervomaiske, 8km northwest of Donetsk City.[36]
  • The Ukrainian General Staff continued to report that Russian forces are attempting to create conditions for the transition to an offensive in some areas of the Zaporizhia and Kherson directions.[37] ISW has not observed indicators that Russian forces are preparing to launch sustained offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast or any offensive activity in Kherson Oblast.
  • Ukrainian Deputy Prosecutor General Viktoriya Litvinova reported that Russia deported about 16,000 children of whom 307 were able to return to Ukraine.[38] The Ukrainian Presidential Commissioner for Human Rights Daria Herasimchuk reported that Russian officials use coercive tactics to separate Ukrainian children from their parents in order to deport them.[39]
  • Ukrainian First Lady Olena Zelenska reported that Ukrainian prosecutors are investigating 171 cases of sexual assault committed by Russian Forces against Ukrainian citizens.[40] . . . .

The likely imminent culmination of the Russian offensive around Bakhmut, the already culminated Russian offensive around Vuhledar, and the stalling Russian offensive in Luhansk Oblast are likely setting robust conditions for Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces had regained the initiative in Ukraine as of February 8, but Russian forces have since failed to capitalize on that initiative to secure any operationally significant gains.[32] Russian forces will likely lose the initiative in Ukraine within the coming months due to the likely culmination of their three main offensive efforts. Ukrainian forces previously seized the initiative after the culmination of the Russian offensive to capture Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in July of 2022 and conducted counteroffensives operations a few months later that resulted in the liberation of large swathes of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts. The culmination of Russia’s current three offensive efforts will likely allow Ukrainian forces to launch counteroffensives anywhere along the frontline that they deem best suited for such operations. The high manpower and equipment costs that the Russian military has spent in failed offensive operations in Luhansk and western Donetsk oblasts and on the operationally insignificant city of Bakhmut will benefit these likely upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensives.

 

Ukraine war: Russia's Wagner boss suggests 'betrayal' in Bakhmut battle

 

The Hill
In Ukraine, a good news story is building


NPR
Russia's foreign minister gets laughed at over Ukraine remarks at a global conference

 

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-bakhmut-0713f4b6c03e04e88a9a7d589cf00000
Ukraine unyielding in Bakhmut as Russian troops close KYIV, Ukraine (AP) —



Reports are that the Ukrainian military command is determined hold Bakhmut, officials in Kyiv officials said on Monday. Russian forces continued to inch on the early destroyed Ukrainian city which the terrorist Russian invaders have are attempting t to capture for several six months and the terrorists have squandered thousands of lives doing so.

President Zelenskyy’s office said he chaired a meeting with top military rads who advocated strengthening the Ukrainian positions around Bakhmut.

Fighting is intense and Russian shelling of the city and nearby villages is constant. I have to trust that the decision to hold on for now that was blessed by Zalenskyy is a good one. Moscow deployed real troops there and Wagner terrorists in a bid to “win” at least one victory to satisfy Putin’s ego and terrorist appetite.

The Ukrainian military says that they have an escape path in the event of a imminent Russian takeover of Bakhmut. The administration better not get caught in another Mariupol were they all but abandoned the Azov regiment or was that part of the plan. If there is a “positive “ here at least the Russians have appeared to have already lost a hell of a lot more troops and Wagnerite criminals at Bakhmut than in Mriulpol.

 

The story on the rebuilding of Ukraine is a much needed spiritual lift for Americans of Ukrainian decent.

 

• “Ukrainian Deputy Prosecutor General Viktoriya Litvinova reported that Russia deported about 16,000 children of whom 307 were able to returnto Ukraine.[38] The Ukrainian Presidential Commissioner for Human Rights Daria Herasimchuk reported that Russian officials use coercivetactics to separate Ukrainian children from their parents in order todeport them.[39]”
• 
  Unless the west provides more weapons such as fighter aircraft and continues to support Ukraine to very seriously damage Russian invaders all these nice sentimental words of punishing Russian war crimes are just BS.

 

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-at...m-air-defense-system-at-firing-positions.html

Ukrainian defenders hit Russian missile system, air defense system at firing positions

Ukrainian “defenders “ hit Russian an anti-aircraft missile system and an air defense system smack right at the Russian firing positions. Ukrainians also hit Russian missile artillery units and three enemy personnel clusters. It is not yet known or at least not yet reported how many Russian personal were eliminated.
The Air Force of the AFU completed 12 strikes on various enemy positions.

 

Russia advances in Bakhmut by sending waves of mercenaries to certain death
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his top commanders insisted they would continue defending the eastern city despite heavy losses.
By Siobhán O'Grady, Robyn Dixon, Anastacia Galouchka, David L. Stern and Annabelle Timsit
DNIPRO, Ukraine — It takes Ukrainian troops little more than a glance to tell if Russian fighters advancing on their positions near the fiercely embattled city of Bakhmut are seasoned soldiers or recent recruits.

The men enlisted to fight for Russia’s Wagner mercenary force — many of them convicted criminals recruited behind bars and sent to fight in Ukraine in exchange for their freedom — are “dirtier and they don’t have the same military uniforms or flak jackets like regular Russian soldiers,” said Dmytro Vatagin, 48, a Ukrainian soldier stationed in the neighboring village of Ivanivske with the volunteer 24th Battalion.

The mercenary fighters typically move on Ukrainian positions early in the morning, he said, attempting attacks in irregular and unpredictable patterns, seemingly without any clear strategy, which makes them seem “unprepared” for battle.

It is only later in the day that better-trained Russian forces often enter the fray, seeking to make a real advance.

“Wagner and the mobilized are being just thrown like meat” toward the front line, Vatagin said. . . .

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 6, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian authorities indicated that Ukraine will continue to defend Bakhmut for now.
• Bakhmut is not intrinsically significant operationally or strategically as ISW has previously observed. But Ukraine’s fight for Bakhmut has become strategically significant because of the current composition of Russian forces arrayed in the area. The Battle of Bakhmut may, in fact, severely degrade the Wagner Group’s best forces, depriving Russia of some of its most effective and most difficult-to-replace shock troops.
• Wagner Group head Yevgeny Prigozhin apparently fears that his forces are being expended in exactly this way. The severe degradation or destruction of the elite Wagner fighting force would have positive ramifications beyond the battlefield.
• The Kremlin is returning to its previously unsuccessful volunteer recruitment and crypto-mobilization campaigns to avoid calling the second mobilization wave. The return of the voluntary recruitment and crypto-mobilization campaigns likely indicates that the Kremlin will not launch another mobilization wave at least before the summer 2023 due to spring conscription cycle on April 1.
• A reportedly captured Russian military manual suggests that Russian forces intend to use the newly created “assault detachment” elements in urban warfare.
• Russian forces utilized a new type of guided aerial bomb against Ukrainian targets amid continued precision missile shortages.
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks northwest of Svatove and near Kreminna.
• Russian forces secured territorial gains in Bakhmut but have not yet encircled the city or forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw.
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks near Avdiivka and west of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces continue struggling to maintain fire control over the Dnipro River Delta in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian military command is failing to properly equip its forces despite forces increasingly conducting close combat in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials reported on alleged Russian war crimes in Ukraine. . . .

Russian milbloggers are growing increasingly concerned that Ukrainian forces may conduct a counteroffensive push in southern Ukraine. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on March 6 that Ukrainian forces have massed 12,000 troops for an offensive push towards the Sea of Azov coastline in late March or early April.[55] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces transported new weapons and military equipment to western Donetsk Oblast for a future offensive against Melitopol.[56] Another milblogger speculated that Ukrainian forces may instead target Mariupol.[57] . . . .

Russian military command is failing to properly equip its forces despite close combat engagements in Ukraine. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) that Russian military command is ordering mobilized reservists to assault Ukrainian concrete positions with only firearms and shovels.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian officers on the Donetsk, Marinka, Kupyansk, Zaporizhia, and Kreminna frontlines lack jeeps and pickup trucks for daily reconnaissance, sabotage, and logistics efforts.[63] The milblogger noted that the Russian reliance on trucks is impractical as these vehicles have high fuel consumption and noted instances of breakdown of automotive equipment as a result of low-quality fuel and lubricants.[64] Another milblogger complained that Russian forces lack modern optical systems because the Russian MoD took over four months to sign a contract with a company for the production of optical systems.[65] The milblogger added that the Russian MoD also did not make the promised downpayment for these optical systems. Another milblogger observed that Russian medics refuse to treat injured Russian servicemen, forcing Russian forces to drag injured personnel kilometers away from the frontlines.[66] Mobilized personnel from Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, and Kaliningrad oblasts complained about receiving outdated weaponry from the 1940s.[67] . . .

 

USA Today
Ukraine updates: Russia resorting to 60-year-old battle tanks

 

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-at...nate-1060-russian-invaders-over-past-day.html


“The Armed Forces of Ukraine eliminated about 154,830 Russian troops in Ukraine from February 24, 2022 to March 7, 2023, including 1,060 occupiers over the past day alone.”

My comments. It is really nice that the Ukrainians “eliminated” 1060 Russian fighters and/or terrorists but Ukrainians need to destroy more Russia equipment such as tanks, offensive and defensive rocket systems, anti aircraft and extremely important to smear Russian aircraft. The body count of Russian fighters needs to increase by 33% more than a thousand at .East 4 out of 5 days a week to start making a dent.


“The enemy’s total combat losses include also 3,432 tanks (+9 over the past day), 6,714 armored combat vehicles (+11), 2,456 artillery systems (+23), 488 multiple launch rocket systems, 253 air defense systems (+3), 303 aircraft (+1), 289 helicopters, 5,323 motor vehicles (+16), 18 warships/cutters, 2,095 unmanned aerial vehicles (+9), 236 special equipment units. A total of 873 enemy cruise missiles were shot down.”

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 7, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 7 that Russian forces will have an “open road” to capture key cities in Donbas. ISW continues to assess, however, that Russian forces lack the capability to exploit the tactical capture of Bakhmut to generate operational effects, and will likely rapidly culminate following the capture of Bakhmut.
• Russian forces likely lack the mechanized forces necessary to advance beyond Bakhmut, and the tactical “assault detachments” used in assaults against Bakhmut are likely unable to conduct maneuver warfare.
• Russian forces have likely captured the eastern part of Bakhmut east of the Bakhmutka River following a controlled Ukrainian withdrawal from eastern Bakhmut as of March 7.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu reiterated boilerplate rhetoric seeking to deter further Western military aid to Ukraine.
• Shoigu additionally outlined long-term and likely aspirational efforts to restore and expand the Russian officer corps.
• Russia exchanged 130 Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POWs) for 90 Russian POWs on March 7.
• Russian independent polling organization The Levada Center released poll results that 51 percent of Russians feel negatively toward Russians who left the country due to mobilization, indicating at minimum negative feelings towards those that escaped mobilization, if not overt support for the war.
• The New York Times (NYT) stated on March 7 that low-confidence and unverified intelligence reviewed by US officials may suggest that a pro-Ukrainian group carried out an attack on the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022, but made clear this is a very low confidence assessment.
• US Air Force General James Hecker confirmed on March 6 that the US has provided Ukraine with Joint Direct Attack Munition Extended Range (JDAM-ER) kits.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces attempt to conduct operations across the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian federal authorities continue to place the onus of solving mobilization issues onto Russian regional authorities who then absolve themselves of ongoing Russian command issues.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to import employees from various Russian law enforcement agencies to staff vacancies in occupation administrations. . . .

Russian forces, including Wagner Group, are lowering their recruitment standards under the backdrop of high losses in the ongoing battle for Bakhmut. Independent Russian outlet The Moscow Times reported on March 6 that the Wagner Group loosened medical requirements for individuals to serve “to remove unnecessary bureaucracy,” now only refusing to take those with serious, performance-affecting conditions, those with Hepatitis B or C, and drug addicts.[50] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin accused the Russian MoD on March 4 of not allowing Wagner Group to reinforce itself with fresh recruits, including convicts.[51] Russian opposition outlet Important Stories reported on March 6 that a St. Petersburg health facility distributed military summons to its patients.[52] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) released an intercepted call on March 6 in which a Russian soldier complained that the Russian military command is staffing his unit with chronically ill personnel due to a lack of suitable personnel.[53] . . . .

 

Poland says it will send 10 more Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine this week

Reuters
“Polish President Andrzej Duda and Minister of National Defence Mariusz Blaszczak visited the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade to meet with Polish instructors and Ukrainian soldiers training on Leopard 2 A4 tanks in Swietoszow, Poland ack on February 13, 2023. REUTERS/Kacper Pempel/File
End of article.
Good news! Again I say that Poland made a promise and kept it. Yes of course besides Poland keeping promises many other countries have also lead by the U.S., UK, and so has Germany….




WARSAW, March 7 (Reuters) - Poland will send 10 more German-made Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine this week, the Polish defence minister said on Tuesday.

Reporting by Alan Charlish and Pawel Florkiewicz; Editing by Susan Fenton
Photo

Good news! Again I say that Poland made a promise and kept it. Yes of course besides Poland keeping promises many other countries have also lead by the U.S., UK, and so has Germany….

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 8, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways

• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced on March 8 that Russian forces captured all of eastern Bakhmut, a claim consistent with available visual evidence
• Russian forces remain unlikely to exploit a breakthrough beyond Bakhmut if Russian forces capture the city.
• The Kremlin may be attempting to establish a new Russian government-controlled armed formation billed as a volunteer unit through the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom.
• A US official denied that US intelligence assessed that a pro-Ukrainian group sabotaged the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022.
• German and Polish officials announced that Germany and Poland will deliver 28 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine in March 2023, which will bolster Ukraine’s capabilities to conduct a counteroffensive amidst high Russian tank losses.
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on March 8 but have not succeeded in completing a turning movement around the city.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the outskirts of Donetsk City.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces landed on the Dnipro River Delta islands for the third consecutive day.
• The Kremlin is doubling down on reviving volunteer recruitment campaigns throughout Russia and occupied Ukraine.
• Russian hospitals are continuing to form new medical centers in Russia in an effort to maximize the capacity for overfilling hospitals in occupied territories to treat wounded Russian servicemen.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to drain Russian federal subjects’ budgets. Governor of Primorsky Krai Oleg Kozhemyako stated on March 7 that his administration has spent more than four billion rubles (approximately $52.6 million) to support Russian servicemen and their families as of January 10.[61] Kozhemyanko claimed that Primorsky Krai spent 2.2 billion rubles on military equipment and supplies, while the rest went into different financial compensations. While ISW cannot independently verify Kozhemyako’s claims, it is very likely the Kremlin continues to heavily tap into regional budgets to finance its war. Primorsky Krai also had one of the most active volunteer recruitment campaigns over the summer of 2022 to reinforce the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade. ISW previously assessed that it costs a federal subject around $1.2 million per month to pay the salaries for a volunteer unit of 400 men receiving a monthly salary of $3,000, let alone sustain the unit.[62] . . .

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 9, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways

• Russian forces conducted the largest missile strike across Ukraine of 2023 likely only to advance Russian state propaganda objectives.
• Russian forces likely advanced northwest of Bakhmut amid a likely increased tempo of Russian offensive operations in the area.
• The Wagner Group’s offensive operation in eastern Bakhmut appears to have entered a temporary tactical pause and it remains unclear if Wagner fighters will retain their operational preponderance in future Russian offensives in the city.
• Russian forces may be preparing to resume offensive operations around Vuhledar, although persistent personnel and ammunition issues will likely continue to constrain Russian forces from advancing.
• Internal dynamics within the Russian military may be driving the potential resumption of costly offensives near Vuhledar that offer little prospect of operational benefit.
• Russian authorities are likely formalizing structures to create and coopt volunteer-based military formations under state-owned energy companies in order to distribute accountability, reduce burdens on the national budget, and avoid sanctions.
• The Transnistrian occupation government accused the Ukrainian government of involvement in a claimed terrorist plot, likely as part of the Russian information operations to undermine Ukrainian credibility and destabilize Moldova.
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks throughout the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut but have not completed a turning movement or enveloped or encircled the city.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the outskirts of Donetsk City and near Vuhledar.
• Russian strikes completely disconnected the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast, from all external power sources for 10 hours.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian occupation authorities are preparing for a spring 2023 mobilization wave in occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts that may include male teenagers born in 2006.
• Russian officials and occupation authorities are continuing efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian political and bureaucratic systems. . . .

The Kremlin likely deliberately launched missiles that Ukrainian air defenses cannot intercept to achieve results within the Russian information space despite the dwindling supplies of such missiles. Ihnat noted that Russia has up to 50 Kinzhal missiles and had used some missiles that it cannot replace. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely used these scarce missiles in fruitless attacks to appease the Russian pro-war and ultranationalist communities, which have overwhelmingly called on him to retaliate for the Bryansk Oblast incident on March 2.[10] Russian milbloggers and propagandists have also criticized the Russian missile campaign for failing to make Ukraine “freeze” over the winter in late February and early March before the spring season.[11] Putin likely attempted to offset these narratives with another missile attack similar to the ones that Russia conducted in the fall of 2022, using advanced missiles to guarantee some damage in Ukraine. Russian milbloggers did not overwhelmingly support today‘s strikes, however, noting that the Kremlin needs to fundamentally change its targeting approach given that Ukraine has adapted to the established attack pattern against its energy infrastructure.[12] . . . .

Ukrainian forces conducted a likely HIMARS strike against a Russian transport hub in Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast on March 9. Russian occupation authorities accused Ukrainian forces of conducting a strike against an auto transport enterprise in Volnovakha (north of Mariupol at the N20 and T0509 intersection), and geolocated imagery shows severe damage to the building and some busses.[52] Russian sources claimed that the strike destroyed 10 civilian buses.[53] Wagner Group forces reportedly used busses to transport Wagner personnel through southern Ukraine, as ISW has previously reported.[54] . . . .

 

Very interesting
(41) Nachgefragt: Der Krieg um die Geschichte der Ukraine I Bundeswehr - YouTube

If you want the subtitel in Englisch use the youtube settings tool, the little weel.

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 10, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways

• US intelligence warned that individuals with ties to Russian intelligence may be planning to attempt to instigate an insurrection in Moldova.
• Russian forces continue to establish defensive lines in areas in rear areas far from current frontlines and areas in Russia that will likely never see fighting.
• Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, confirmed that the Russian government is using a variety of schemes to deport Ukrainian children to Russia in a comment that was apparently meant to disprove Western allegations of the illegality of these actions.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian sources claimed that Wagner Group forces entered the built-up AZOM industrial complex, and frontal assaults on the complex will likely be costly for Wagner Group forces.
• Russian forces made gains in Bakhmut, are clearing eastern parts of the city, and have advanced to new positions in northwestern Bakhmut within 800 meters of the AZOM metal processing plant.
• Russian forces continue reconnaissance activity near islands in the Dnipro River delta.
• The Wagner Group continues to expand efforts to recruitment efforts in Russia.
• Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to announce new infrastructure projects to increase connectivity between the Russian mainland and occupied territories. . . .

The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian troops continued ground attacks on Bakhmut itself; northwest of Bakhmut near Zalizianske (10km northwest), Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest), and Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest); and west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west).[21] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that the combat intensity in Bakhmut is very high and that the Wagner Group has committed its “main part” to the fight, supporting ISW’s assessment that Wagner has increasingly committed high-quality operators to offensives in Bakhmut.[22] A Russian milblogger posted a crowdfunding request for Russian airborne (VDV) elements operating in the Soledar area northeast of Bakhmut, suggesting that VDV elements are likely supporting or supplanting Wagner operations along parts of the front in Bakhmut as ISW assessed in January 2023.[23] Russian sources, including Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, claimed that Ukrainian forces appear to be preparing for a counteroffensive in the Bakhmut area.[24] . . . .

Russian officials and occupation authorities announced further plans to construct new healthcare facilities to treat Russian servicemen as hospitals near the frontlines remain overfilled and understaffed. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Timur Ivanov met with Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev in Crimea on March 10 to evaluate the development of civilian and military infrastructure in Crimea. Razvozhaev claimed that military builders are constructing several facilities in Sevastopol, and that construction has begun to build a military hospital with 150 beds.[60] Razvozhaev emphasized that the military hospital will include a modern medical and diagnostic building, an infectious diseases department, a blood transfusion station, and an oxygen station.[61] The Russian Ministry of Defense announced that the new military hospital will employ 300 people.[62] . . .

 

The wheels are coming off.
Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 11, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways

• Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances within Bakhmut on March 11.
• Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova confirmed that there is infighting in the Kremlin inner circle, that the Kremlin has ceded centralized control over the Russian information space, and implicitly that Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot fix it.
• Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin said that he would transform the Wagner Group into a hardline ideological elite parallel military organization after the Battle of Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian sources report that Ukrainian forces advanced toward Svatove.
• Russian forces continue to establish fortifications in Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian mobilized soldiers continue to publicize complaints that commanders treat them poorly and used them as expendable manpower to patch holes in existent formations.
• Russian occupation officials use children’s healthcare to generate dependency on the Russian healthcare system. . . .

Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Svatove. A Ukrainian media source reported on March 11 that Ukrainian forces entered Kuzemivka (14km northwest of Svatove) on an unspecified date and now hold positions 11km away from Svatove.[12] . . . .

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian logistics and force concentration areas in southern Ukraine. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on March 10 that Ukrainian forces struck three Russian ammunition warehouses, air defenses, and four manpower and equipment concentration areas on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on March 9 and 10.[26] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command also reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions on the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast.[27] Ukrainian sources implied on March 11 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions near Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, but Russian sources denied that Ukrainian forces conducted strikes in the area.[28] . . . .

Russian authorities continue to struggle to crack down on desertion and resistance to forcible extension of military contracts. A Russian regional news source reported on March 10 that a military court in Moscow will try eight mobilized soldiers from Kaliningrad Oblast for desertion, a charge that reportedly carries a prison term of up to 15 years.[34] A Russian news outlet stated on March 10 that volunteers from Tatarstan with expired contracts are attempting to return home but face criminal prosecution under desertion articles.[35] A Russian opposition exposé source on March 10 amplified a written complaint from military unit 24314, currently located in Rostov Oblast, addressed to Russia’s Southern Military District military prosecutor wherein soldiers complained that their commanders prevent them from leaving, call them deserters, and threaten attritional deployments for attempting to leave once their contracts expire.[36] . . . .

 

It seems Mafiosi may be losing the "information war"??....by the apparent infighting in the Kremlin.

 

This is delicious.

World
The New Voice of Ukraine
Russia reacts angrily to its possible renaming by Ukraine to Muscovy

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 12, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, March 12. This report establishes a comprehensive timeline of the rivalry between Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which likely reached a boiling point over Bakhmut. The report also analyzes the Russian MoD’s likely intent to expend Wagner forces in Bakhmut and explores Russian President Vladimir Putin’s manipulation of this conflict to maintain the stability of his regime.

The conflict between the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin likely reached its climax against the backdrop of the Battle of Bakhmut. The Russian MoD – specifically Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff General Valery Gerasimov – is likely seizing the opportunity to deliberately expend both elite and convict Wagner forces in Bakhmut in an effort to weaken Prigozhin and derail his ambitions for greater influence in the Kremlin. The Russian MoD had been increasingly restricting Prigozhin’s ability to recruit convicts and secure ammunition, forcing Prigozhin to publicly recognize his dependency on the Russian MoD. Prigozhin, for example, publicly complained that he mailed a letter and tried to send his representative – likely to Shoigu and Gerasimov – with an urgent demand for ammunition, but that the representative was not allowed to present his complaints.[1] Prigozhin had been able to grow his forces by 40,000 convicts likely with the Kremlin’s permission to recruit in prisons in 2022 but lost that permission and access to that manpower pool at the beginning of 2023.[2] Prigozhin has threatened to withdraw Wagner forces from Bakhmut and insinuated that the Russian MoD used Wagner to bear the brunt of the high-intensity attritional urban warfare to seize Bakhmut in order to conserve Russian conventional forces.[3] These threats and complaints indicate that Prigozhin is aware of the gravity of his conflict with the Russian MoD.

The Russian military leadership may be trying to expend Wagner forces – and Prigozhin’s influence – in Bakhmut. Russian forces’ rate of advance in Bakhmut slowed following the Ukrainian withdrawal from eastern Bakhmut around March 7.[4] ISW assessed on March 6 that Wagner had to commit its elite forces to maintain offensive momentum in Bakhmut but may be running out of these forces during direct assaults on eastern, southern, and northern parts of Bakhmut.[5] Geolocated footage published on February 18 showed 43 buses with Wagner mercenaries moving from Crimea via Melitopol possibly to reinforce positions in Bakhmut.[6] Prigozhin complained on March 5 and 6 that Wagner needed additional reinforcements, and Ukrainian military officials observed that Russian forces were suffering a seven-to-one casualty ratio compared to Ukrainian forces.[7] . . . .

 

I invented Moskhailshchyna from what the Zaporozhian Kozaks called Russians- Moskhailiy - proklata Hulera I can add

 

Very funny…….. those poor Moskhailiy are so thin skinned and they ignore their own history.

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 13, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways

• A member of the Kremlin-affiliated Valdai Discussion Club accused Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of pursuing political objectives in Russia that are endangering Wagner forces in Bakhmut. This attack on Prigozhin is in line with ISW’s March 12 assessment that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be deliberately expending Wagner forces in Bakhmut to derail Prigozhin’s political aspirations.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to maintain Chechnya’s relevance in the Russian political and military sphere.
• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Iranian officials in Tehran on March 13 to expand bilateral cooperation and bolster sanctions mitigations.
• Russian milbloggers continue to speculate about a prospective Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine, suggesting increasing concern in the Russian information space about Ukrainian combat capabilities as Russian forces pin themselves on offensive operations in Bakhmut.
• A Russian State Duma bill aiming to raise the conscription age suggests that the Kremlin is not planning to conduct full mobilization in the future.
• The Russian military is reportedly employing the newly created “assault detachments” in different manners across different tactical situations.
• Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine Iryna Vereshchuk confirmed that Russia has illegally deported 2,161 Ukrainian orphans to Russia.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks throughout the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and made marginal gains northeast of Kupyansk and east of Siversk.
• Russian forces continued making advances in and around Bakhmut but have not succeeded in completing a turning movement, envelopment, or encirclement of the city as of March 13.
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast front line.
• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct raids against areas in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
• Subordination of mobilized Russian military personnel to Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR/LNR) formations is generating increasing discontent.
• Russian occupation officials continue to introduce new provisions to discourage and restrict the use of the Ukrainian language in educational facilities. . . .

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct raids against areas in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian officials posted footage on March 10 showing Ukrainian forces conducting a limited raid in an unspecified area in east bank Kherson Oblast.[61] . . . .

A Russian milblogger claimed that there is a high desertion rate among Russian SPETSNAZ forces in Ukraine.[69] The milblogger claimed that SPETSNAZ units in Ukraine are all understaffed, that even commanders have deserted these units, and that many SPETSNAZ veterans returned to serve with Russian forces in Ukraine following the start of partial mobilization but have since deserted in high numbers. SPETSNAZ units are some of the most combat-capable forces within the Russian military and the reported high desertion rate may suggest that persistent personnel issues among Russian forces in Ukraine affect elite units as much as they do non-elite units. ISW has not observed confirmation of the high SPETSNAZ desertion rate, however. . . .

 

Russian war criminals to be prosecuted.



ICC to issue first arrest warrants linked to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine