Hitler wanted to be the good guy. He always came up with reason to attack another country. He couldn't come up with one for invading Turkey.
Do you have a link for that 83%? I've heard countless historians come to completely different conclusions. Also, combat power is much different than physical troop numbers. Many of the best German armored units were shifted to the Western front in 1944/45.
Which means that the Soviets fought them for 3 or 4 years. Plus a lot of units that were shifted to the West were not considered fit for duty against the Soviets due to losses. The West was considered an area to rest and recover.
It was considered a rest area before Normandy. Units on the Western front were much better equipped and supplied than their counterparts on the Eastern Front. I believe 83% of German casualties were inflicted by the Soviets, but once the allies opened another front, many of the fully equipped German mechanized forces (a lot of the Eastern Front units were poorly equipped Infantry and allied axis troops) got sent West.
That's not entirely true, here is a map from Operation Blue conducted by the Germans in 1942...you'll notice troops (Army group B) are diverted to fight another objective aside from the Caucasus, Stalingrad. German troops were over-extended fighting for two objectives. The primary objective should have been the oil fields.
I agree the Germans should have sought one objective at a time but Stalingrad was the logical choice. Look at a transportation and industrial map of the USSR at the time. The USSR relied on river traffic to move oil from Baku to their industrial heartland on the Volga. Special tankers bring crude and refined product to Astrakan where it is loaded onto river vessels. If the Germans hold Stalingrad, river traffic is stopped and the Baku/Maikop oil fields are not defensible. Astrakhan is in a swamp and east of Stalingrad there are no railroads, so a Soviet counteroffensive must perforce come from the north. Upon taking the Donets Basin, the optimum German course of action would be: 1) concentrated drive east using Don river as the right flank 2) go on defensive along the Don 3) Cross the Don at the bend and take Stalingrad and river bluffs upriver of Stalingrad 4) Only after Stalingrad is taken and solidified, move south and clear out the Caucasus. With Stalingrad and the volga gone the Cucasus is isolated 5) Dig in north of Stalingrad for inevitable winter counter offensive. If Stalingrad cannot be taken, bomb the living crap out of Baku, Maikop, and Astrakhan to deny Stalin the Baku oil. Use air-dropped mines to mine the lower Volga just before it freezes in December. Stalin needs the Baku/Maikop oil worse than Hitler does.
83% was Col. DuPuy's number. It came at the Battle of the Bulge. For details, you'd have to read his book.
After reviewing your synopsis, I'd have to concur...perhaps you missed your calling as a general officer. Stalingrad should have been the first and primary objective...prior to pushing further South towards the oil fields.
Find the quote and provide it. You can't tell someone to read an entire book to support your position, particularly when it's only a single statistic you're talking about. You likely mistook the 83% statistic for casualties and not combat forces.
Stalin dedicated millions of reserve forces only after Stalingrad fell under attack...if indeed Stalingrad was the better objective, why not make that your primary objective and do not dedicate panzer and infantry divisions to push further South...Hitler thought he could have both...as Stalingrad began to fall..Stalin made that the Soviet Union's focal point for fighting the Germans, losing the Battle of Stalingrad was the beginning of the end for the Germans on the Eastern Front. Germany did not do the same...they strung out their forces, some diverting East and some pushing South.
Some forces had to be dedicated south because the Germans needed to control the whole Don river in order to prevent a crossing and evelopment from the right. Really, the entire German battle plan was doomed to failure after they were stopped in front of Leningrad and Moscow. Going by the operational map that you gave, I would have stopped Army Group A's advance at Stavropol and diverted all of Army Group B to hook East around Stalingrad. Maybe even push them all the way to Astrakhan.