Running Newsticker for the War in Ukraine

...and the flightline ecosystems....unfortunately it's not that simple...there's a very big picture being missed

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 7, 2023

Click here to read the full report
Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces may be suffering losses along the entire front in Ukraine at a rate close to the rate at which Russia is currently generating new forces.
• Russia does appear able to continue absorbing such losses and making them good with new recruits, however, as long as President Vladimir Putin is willing and able to absorb the domestic consequences.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new security assistance package and joint weapons production pledge to Ukraine against the backdrop of the International Forum for Defense Industries (DFNC1) in Washington, D.C. on December 6-7.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed developing Russian-Iranian economic relations with Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in Moscow on December 7.
• Attacks on public figures in Russia have prompted officials to propose increased security measures for Russian political and public figures and some ultranationalists to call for the resurrection of Soviet security organizations.
• The Russian Federation Council adopted a resolution confirming that the upcoming Russian presidential elections will occur on March 17, 2024, amid continued Kremlin efforts to legitimize the elections.
• Russian security organs conducted mass arrests targeting high-profile gangs in Moscow and St. Petersburg, including members and co-conspirators within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and other internal security organs.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and marginally advanced near Avdiivka.
• Russian authorities continue to rebuff appeals from the relatives of mobilized Russian military personnel.
• Ukrainian partisans and residents in occupied territories continue to provide Ukrainian officials with targeting information. . . . .

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 8, 2023
Dec 8, 2023 - ISW Press



Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his presidential bid for 2024 on December 8 in an obviously staged effort to seem that he was running at the request of Russian servicemen. Putin announced that he would run for president in the 2024 elections in conversation with Russian military personnel after the presentation of Gold Star medals in the Grand Kremlin Palace on December 8.

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 8, 2023

Click to read the full report with maps
Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his presidential bid for 2024 on December 8 in an obviously staged effort to seem that he was running at the request of Russian servicemen.
• Putin’s announcement of his presidential bid in a military setting indicates that his campaign may focus on Russia’s war in Ukraine more than ISW previously assessed, although the extent of this focus is unclear at this time.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 7 to 8.
• Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin forecasted on December 7 that there will be “no agreement” between Russia and Ukraine to end the war and ”no freeze” of the frontlines in Ukraine, marking a notable shift from Girkin’s prior claims that the Russian military intended to “freeze the frontline” until after the Russian presidential elections.
• The Russian military has reportedly banned the use of civilian cars for military purposes likely as part of ongoing formalization efforts, sparking criticisms from Russian milbloggers.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is expanding its ability to guard Russian officials and entities abroad likely to better surveil Russian and international actors outside of Russian territory.
• Russian occupation officials continue efforts to artificially alter the demographic composition of occupied Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s partners continued to announce military and financial aid packages to Ukraine recently.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Udmurt Republic Head Alexander Brechalov announced on December 7 that the region formed and will soon deploy four new units to fight in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 8 that Russia is trying to destroy Ukrainian children’s connection to Ukraine and that swift intervention is necessary to maintain this connection during a speech at the first meeting of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children. . . . .

 

Yahoo News
Russia 'unable to repair missile ship Askold' after precision missile strike by

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 9, 2023

Click here to read the full report with maps
Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have likely committed to offensive operations in multiple sectors of the front during a period of the most challenging weather of the fall-winter season in an effort to seize and retain the initiative prior to the Russian presidential elections in March 2024.
• Ukrainian forces, by contrast, appear to be using this period of challenging weather and ongoing Russian offensive operations to establish and consolidate defensive positions along the parts of the frontline where they have not been conducting counteroffensive operations, thereby conserving manpower and resources for future offensive efforts.
• The establishment of local defensive positions in areas Kyiv is not prioritizing for current or imminent counteroffensive operations is a prudent step and not an indication that Ukraine has abandoned all plans for future counteroffensives.
• The Kremlin-backed United Russia party is spearheading Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nomination as an independent candidate in the 2024 Russian presidential election, and Putin’s re-election campaign initiatives group includes people with a variety of backgrounds and constituencies to create the image of widespread support for Putin’s presidency.
• Multiple Russian political opposition figures have reportedly developed a common campaign strategy for the upcoming presidential campaign cycle aimed at compelling Putin to address topics he seeks to avoid and revealing the breadth of Russian opposition against Putin.
• Select Russian milbloggers accused the Armenian government of promoting Russophobic policies that inspire violence against Russian media figures in Armenia on December 9.
• The European Union (EU) will allow member states to restrict Russian gas imports in an effort to restrain Russian petroleum revenues.
• A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian decoy missiles failed to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses during December 8 missile strikes against Kyiv City.
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov highlighted Ukrainian anti-corruption efforts and preparations for the arrival of F-16 fighter jets in the near future on December 9.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Kreminna.
• Relatives of mobilized Russian military personnel continued to appeal to the Russian government for the return of their relatives from the war in Ukraine.
• The Russian Ministry of Culture continues to orchestrate efforts to Russify Ukrainian children and facilitate their deportation to Russia. . . . . .

Relatives of mobilized Russian military personnel continued to appeal to the Russian government for the return of their relatives from the war in Ukraine. The “Way Home” group, a movement of relatives of mobilized Russian military personnel, published photos on December 9 showing women holding posters appealing to Russian President Vladimir Putin for the return of their relatives from Ukraine and for their demobilization.[69] Members of the ”Way Home” movement also laid flowers at the Eternal Flame in Moscow on December 9 in honor of Russian military personnel who have died in the war in Ukraine after the police initially warned the group against the action on December 8 and then tried to prevent some of the group from laying flowers on December 9.[70] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported that many members of the movement did not participate in the event after police issued warnings to some individuals of the group on December 8.[71] . . . .

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 10, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova emphasized that Russia's maximalist objectives in Ukraine have not changed, repeating the Kremlin’s demand for full Ukrainian political capitulation and Kyiv’s acceptance of Russia’s military and territorial demands rather than suggesting any willingness to negotiate seriously.
• Zakharova's demand that Ukraine withdraw its troops from "Russian territory" as a necessary prerequisite for the resolution of the war suggests that Russia's maximalist objectives include controlling the entirety of the four oblasts it has illegally annexed parts of.
• The Kremlin continues to express an increasingly anti-Israel position in the Israel–Hamas war despite feigning interest in being a neutral arbitrator in the conflict.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky traveled to Latin America on December 10 likely in order to secure Latin American support for Ukraine.
• Russian military authorities in Armenia are likely attempting to maintain military power over Armenia amidst the continued deterioration of Armenian-Russian relations.
• Russian forces conducted a small series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on December 9 and 10.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
• Russian milbloggers continue to criticize the purported Russian military ban on the use of civilian vehicles for military purposes.
• Russian authorities continue long-term efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian students in occupied Ukraine by directing funding to educational institutions in occupied Ukraine. . . . .

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on December 10 and recently made gains. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces were somewhat successful in the Serebryanske forest area in the past week.[35] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Synkivka, Torske (15km west of Kreminna), and the Serebryanske forest area on December 9 and 10.[36] . . . .

 

Combat training was the #1 priority hence that was the focus.

STRATEGIC training is a whole DIFFERENT ball game and it LITERALLY requires the GAMING of war time scenarios against various opponents under differing conditions.

I have no doubt that the SENIOR military ranks in Ukraine will have some exposure to this level of training in the past. What MATTERS is how they APPLIED their training to the DEFENSE of Ukraine and then the OFFENSE to rid their nation of the Orc virus.

Their DEFENSE strategy was about as good as it gets and yes, Orc INCOMPETENCE did contribute towards their own DEFEAT.

Giving ground that you know you cannot defend is a well known military strategy which the Ukrainian high command would have established within their war planning.

The Ukrainian Counter Attack in the North was probably a matter of REALIGNING where the Commanders wanted to be PRIOR to the OFFENSIVE.

The media have made a lot about Ukraine making little in the way of TERRITORY over the Summer Offensive. There are multiple possibilities so rather than speculate let's think about what would be the OPTIMAL time to go on the offensive? Midsummer when the Orcs are trained and ready or midwinter when they are freezing their asses off standing around in trenches?

From my perspective the Ukrainian Command has done a superb job of WEAKENING the supports for the OCCUPYING Orcs on Ukrainian territory. The Black Sea is a nogo zone for Orc ships and the bridge infrastructure in Crimea can be dropped any time they give the order. The use of drones and long range artillery is DISRUPTING supply lines but I suspect those were just "Ranging Shots" in order to pin point the coordinates. The real use will be during winter to cut the supply lines for around 2 to 3 weeks.

By then the Orcs will be at the point of surrendering just for a hot meal and warm bed.

There is another FACTOR that has not been mentioned as far as I am aware. We have an el Nino effect and when they are this warm the DISRUPT the Polar Vortex in the winter months. This coming winter could be bitterly cold for those standing in trenches.

So IMO the Ukrainian High Command held back from full scale assaults this past summer and focused instead on obtaining TACTICAL control over the Orc LOGISTICS. As long as they are within range they can STARVE the Orcs into submission thanks in part to what could well be a BRUTAL winter.

That is a SMART strategy because it REDUCES the risks to Ukrainian manpower while exposing the Orcs to maximum risks.

Does anyone see any flaws in the above reasoning?

PS Agreed that the Ukrainians are doing things that NATO never imagined. Their sea drones are a NAVAL Game Changer. Their use of drones for MISDIRECTION has been masterful.

 

Ukrainians ask Zelensky in a petition to block the Telegram messenger in Ukraine.

See below a screenshot of the respective petition and a reaction of one Telegram channel to this petition.

 

Putin has bet against the U.S. Now is the time to prove him wrong.
Opinion by the Editorial Board

The war to save Ukraine has reached a parlous turning point, testing the boisterous politics of the United States, Ukraine and Europe. All are struggling with war fatigue, internal dissension and worry over a profoundly uncertain battlefield. But this is the moment that should define democratic strength, showing that open, vigorous debate will lead to decisive choices — not surrender in the face of Russia’s aggression. . . . .

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 11, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) announced on December 11 that Russia will conduct voting for the 2024 presidential election in occupied Ukraine, likely in an attempt to legitimize the Russian occupation and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rule.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 10 to 11.
• The United Kingdom (UK) and Norway will lead a coalition aimed at providing short-term and long-term assistance to the Ukrainian Navy as the UK announced additional maritime aid provisions to Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his intention to expand Russian naval capabilities in areas well beyond Ukraine and Eastern Europe, likely in an effort to strengthen and expand Russia’s ability to threaten the West.
• The Russian State Duma approved amendments allowing Russian courts to fine or assign compulsory work to foreigners who are convicted of crimes in Russia, likely as part of ongoing efforts to coerce migrants into Russian military service.
• Russian National Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev announced on December 11 that the Russian government will make “targeted changes” to the Russian constitution.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 11 and advanced in some areas.
• Ukrainian military officials indicated that Russian forces recently intensified mechanized offensive operations near Avdiivka.
• A Russian law went into effect on December 11 likely aimed at preventing Russian conscripts from fleeing military service.
• Russia continued to illegally deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia under the guise of rehabilitation and medical programs as Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova continued attempts to dispute this practice. . . . .

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and advanced on December 11. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Petropavlivka, Synkivka, Lake Lyman (northwest of Synkivka), Terny, and Dibrova.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked and gained a foothold west of Shyroka Balka.[46] . . . .

 

"Elections"

 

They are to old for erections.

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 12, 2023

Click here to read the full report
Key Takeaways:

• US intelligence reportedly assessed that Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in fall 2023 and through the upcoming winter aim to weaken Western support for Ukraine instead of achieving any immediate operational objectives.
• Russian forces may be conducting costly offensive operations at a time unfavorable for ground maneuver to time the potential shift in battlefield initiative with ongoing conversations in the West about continued support to Ukraine.
• US intelligence also assessed that the war in Ukraine has devastated the pre-war Russian military, although Russia has partially offset these losses and continues to prepare for a long war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with various US officials, including President Joe Biden, and spoke to Congress about US military assistance to Ukraine in Washington, DC on December 12.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes targeting Ukraine on December 12.
• Ukrainian officials stated that Russian special services may have conducted the major cyberattack on Ukrainian mobile operator Kyivstar on December 12.
• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that GUR cyber units recently conducted a successful cyber operation against the Russian Federal Tax Service (FNS).
• Russian news outlet RBK reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin has designated prominent Russian milbloggers as “trusted persons” in his presidential election campaign for the first time.
• A St. Petersburg court sentenced three underage Uzbek migrants and their parents to deportation for extinguishing the Eternal Flame in St. Petersburg amid ongoing tension between Central Asian communities in Russia and Russian authorities.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 12 and advanced in some areas.
• The Russian State Duma adopted a series of laws on December 12 to help further bolster Rosgvardia’s and the Federal Security Service’s (FSB) force generation capacity.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to use the Kremlin-funded pseudo-volunteer “Dvizheniye Pervykh” (Movement of the First) youth organization to indoctrinate Ukrainian youth in occupied Ukraine with Russian and cultural national identities. . . . .

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations northeast and south of Bakhmut on December 12 and recently advanced south of Bakhmut. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky posted footage of Ukrainian forces raising a flag over the Horlivka waste heap (22km southeast of Bakhmut or just west of Horlivka) uncontested, signaling their control of the area.[49] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces control the waste heap.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are taking advantage of the strong winds impacting Russian reconnaissance drones to conduct reconnaissance-in-force along the Horlivka-Mayorske line (20-24km southwest of Bakhmut).[51] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Pazeno, Luhansk Oblast (20km northeast of Bakhmut).[52] . . . .

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 13, 2023

Click here to read the full report
Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin appears to be returning to expansionist rhetoric last observed before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an effort to resurface its claims that Ukraine is part of historically Russian territory and discuss the borders Russian leaders regard as appropriate for a rump Ukrainian state.
• The return of the Kremlin’s notion of a “partitioned Ukraine” is likely an organized effort to mislead the international community into rejecting key components of Ukraine’s sovereignty: its territorial integrity as defined in 1991 and its right to self-determination.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 13 that Ukraine’s decision to transition to defensive operations is motivated by winter weather conditions and not a “crisis,” in response to a recent New York Times (NYT) article.
• Russian and Ukrainian sources continue to report on the impacts of challenging weather conditions on offensive and reconnaissance operations throughout the front, even as reported freezing and snowy winter conditions in eastern Ukraine offer the prospect of better conditions for maneuver.
• A Russian “Storm-Z” assault unit instructor complained that deputy commanders of Russian irregular armed formations are spreading illogical and false claims that present an overly optimistic view of the situation on the front in the Russian media and information space.
• The instructor’s complaint about Russian sources spreading unsubstantiated and maximalist claims largely aligns with ISW’s mapping practices.
• The Russian MoD is likely using formalized irregular unit commanders as a conduit to spread incorrect information about Russian battlefield successes within the Russian information space in order to circumvent the MoD's responsibility.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes on the night of December 12 to 13.
• A Russian hacker group reportedly linked to the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU) and a Russia-aligned hacker group both claimed responsibility for the cyberattack on Ukrainian mobile operator Kyivstar.
• The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) stripped naturalized Russian citizens of their Russian citizenship for the first time, likely as part of ongoing migrant crackdowns aimed at coercing migrants into Russian military service while placating the xenophobic Russian ultranationalist community.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky attended the second Ukraine-Northern Europe Summit in Oslo, Norway on December 13.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, north of and near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west of Donetsk City, along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in various sectors.
• The Chuvash Republic is offering bonuses to foreigners who fight in the war in Ukraine, likely as part of efforts to recruit migrants to the Russian military.
• Occupation authorities continue efforts to destroy Ukrainian national and historical identity. . . . .

 

Euros stepping up.
E.U. agrees to open membership talks for Ukraine
The decision offers an important sign of support, as Ukraine’s progress in fighting off Russia has largely stalled and U.S. commitment to funding has wavered.
By Emily Rauhala and Beatriz Ríos

 

“

• “A St. Petersburg court sentenced three underage Uzbek migrants and their parents to deportation for extinguishing the Eternal Flame in St. Petersburg amid ongoing tension between Central Asian communities in Russia and Russian authorities.”
• 
  Any kind of friction between non Russian minorities and. the Russian government is a welcome event. Of course not a game changer but it is good for the good guys.

 

At least the EU is planning for after the war.

 

And for now, because this means money for the Ukraine
How it came about is rather interesting. Some people in Germany had done their homework. They told Scholz, if Orban leaves the room before the vote and returns after the vote, his vote would be counted as not present. Apparently Scholz suggested that to Orban, in their last minute talks. Orban did exactly that, left the council room before the vote. The council voted, Orban's was counted as absent, not present and with that the EU can now start the negotiations with the Ukraine and Moldavia

I had never, ever heard about this possibility.
For Orban it is about the EU money and his standings. This could be used in the future, bribe Orban and instead of a veto he leaves the room, before a vote he would veto, a face saving move, for a fat bribe.

 

That is interesting and innovative. .

 

The High Price of Losing Ukraine
Dec 14, 2023 - ISW Press



The United States has a much higher stake in Russia's war on Ukraine than most people think. A Russian conquest of all of Ukraine is by no means impossible if the United States cuts off all military assistance and Europe follows suit. Such an outcome would bring a battered but triumphant Russian army right up to NATO’s border from the Black Sea to the Arctic Ocean. The Ukrainian military with Western support has destroyed nearly 90% of the Russian army that invaded in February 2022 according to US intelligence sources, but the Russians have replaced those manpower losses and are ramping up their industrial base to make good their material losses at a rate much faster than their pre-war capacity had permitted. . . . .

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 14, 2023

Click here to read the full report
Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin displayed notable confidence in publicly discussing Russia’s war on Ukraine during a joint event combining his annual press conference and “Direct Line” forum on December 14 but did not clearly define his envisioned end state for the full-scale invasion he launched on February 24, 2022.
• Putin reiterated his maximalist objectives for the Russian war in Ukraine, which are likely purposefully opaque to be inclusive of additional goals that Putin may seek to pursue now or later.
• These maximalist objectives also do not exclude Russia’s annexation of occupied Ukrainian territories or additional territorial conquests.
• Putin attempted to rhetorically contextualize Russia's continued maximalist objectives in Ukraine within the wider conception of Russian "sovereignty," an ideological line that has been consistent in the Kremlin's framing of Russian national security and foreign policy since before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Putin claimed that the Russian force grouping in Ukraine is far larger than even Russian officials have characterized, likely in an attempt to both address persistent Russian concerns about a new mobilization wave and to demoralize the West and Ukraine.
• The difference in the reported numbers of Russian personnel involved in the war is likely due to different categorizations of Russian military personnel and does not reflect a significant increase in Russian personnel on the frontline, which Ukrainian forces have consistently been repelling.
• Putin notably addressed the tactical and operational situation in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast but refrained from discussing active Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.
• Putin’s public discussions about issues at the front and about the Russian war effort in general may redirect public anger about problems in the war toward the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Putin also attempted to convince the Russian public that the Russian economy is resilient in the face of international sanctions and the fallout of the war in Ukraine.
• Putin continued to express an increasingly anti-Israel position on the Israel-Hamas war, likely signaling a continuing decline in Russian-Israeli relations.
• Putin attempted to downplay deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations and extricate Russian peacekeeping forces from any responsibility for Armenia’s loss of Nagorno-Karabakh as Armenia appears to be effectively abstaining from participating in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas. . . . .

 

( Trotz stockender Ukraine-Hilfe: Wo Militärökonom Keupp Russland im Nachteil sieht | ZDFheute live - YouTube

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 15, 2023
Click here to read the full report
Key Takeaways:

• German outlet BILD stated on December 14 that unspecified intelligence findings and sources indicate that Russia plans to occupy Ukrainian territory beyond the four (illegally) annexed Ukrainian oblasts throughout 2024-2026.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov threateningly urged Ukraine to negotiate with Russia sooner rather than later in framing consistent with the ISW assessment that Russia intends to achieve its maximalist objectives in Ukraine through military means.
• Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba published an op-ed entitled “There is a Path to Victory in Ukraine” on December 15, wherein he argues that Ukrainian military objectives remain feasible despite increasingly pessimistic discussions in the West.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 14 to 15.
• Finnish authorities closed Finland’s border checkpoints with Russia again on December 15 amid continued Russian hybrid warfare efforts to orchestrate an artificial migrant crisis.
• Germany announced new military and humanitarian aid packages to Ukraine on December 14.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kupyansk, northeast and near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made confirmed advances in several areas.
• Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 14 that “Grom” special units (elite anti-drug special units of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD]) will fully transition to being subordinated to Rosgvardia in early 2024.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin highlighted Russia’s intention to build high-speed railways in occupied Ukraine, likely hours after Ukrainian partisans damaged a key railway line in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. . . .

Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces struck Mariupol, occupied Donetsk Oblast on December 14. Geolocated footage published on December 14 and 15 shows a large fire at two locations in Mariupol, including the “Port City” shopping center.[57] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushenko stated that the second Ukrainian strike hit the ”Port City” shopping center where Russian forces stored miliary equipment, including air defense system components.[58] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the cause of the explosion at the shopping center was the detonation of an unidentified ammunition round in the parking lot.[59] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces store faulty ammunition in the shopping center.[60] Other Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces struck a concrete plant.[61] . . . .

The Ukrainian Resistance Center obtained and released a copy of a report written by the Russian Academy of Sciences on December 15 detailing Russia’s plan to “break up” the European Union (EU) and delegitimize NATO during and following the war in Ukraine.[87] The report stated that Russia will attempt to take advantage of internal strife and domestic political divides in European countries, particularly France, to weaken the EU.[88] Russia will spread anti-US sentiments among the ”world majority” (countries currently neutral towards Russia) to unify them against the US and US-led international organizations.[89] The report states that Russia will insist that China or a ”friendly” Arab country station peacekeepers in Ukraine and that the Baltic states ”demilitarize” after the war in order to humiliate NATO.[90] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that the report defines the ”delegitimization of NATO” as one of Russia’s main goals for the war in Ukraine.[91] The report discourages Russian officials from negotiating with NATO and encourages them to increase nuclear rhetoric to intimidate European countries with phrases such as ”Article Five will not protect you.”[92] ISW cannot independently authenticate the report. . . .

 

This is very much what I have been saying since this summer. After all Russia is a monster sized country compared to Ukraine so thinking that Ukraine will demolish Russian military assets is not logical. What I have also said in the past is that Ukraine’s path to getting rid of Russian invaders and terrorists is to make this war for Russia to win.