Air Power for Patton's Army: The 19th Tactical Air Command in the Second World War

Strasser · Sep 23, 2015

Ran across this earlier, and thought it would interest a couple of posters here.

https://archive.org/details/AirPowerforPattonsArmy

From Chapter 7, pgs. 315-316.

....Yet would a revised manual and sound doctrine be sufficient to preserve the lessons of air-ground cooperation of World War II in the absence of goodwill?
To be sure, in the postwar period of rapid and massive demobilization goodwill did not prevail in the competition for declining budgets, lobbying for an independent Air Force, and a growing emphasis on the strategic nuclear mission to confront the Soviet Union in the Cold War. In later years interservice rivalry among military leaders would lead to precisely the kind of aerial duplication that other leaders in the euphoria of victory after the Second World War argued against. The future would see separate tactical aviation organizations grow and evolve in the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, in addition to the Air Force.53 General Bradley called the victory in Europe a victory for combined arms and joint operations. Though correct, command of the air proved the key to the campaign. In a sense, everything else flowed from the fundamental fact that the Allies achieved and maintained air superiority and their enemy had not. General Weyland realized this as much as any airman. A few years later,
when he assumed command of Far Eastern Air Forces and directed air operations in Korea, few could match his level of tactical air experience and competence.
Yet even Allied air superiority and his impressive background in tactical aviation did not guarantee effective air-ground operations. In fact, Weyland faced enormous problems in coordinating air-ground operations and centralizing control of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine air. At the same time, he struggled to convince the U.S. Army to abandon a traditional view that it should control its own air forces. As Weylands official report on the war observed, an astounding facet of the Korean War was the number of old lessons that had to be relearned.54 That same refrain would be repeated during the Vietnam War.

The lesson, of course, is that air superiority by itself does not ensure either centralized control of air assets by airmen or a proper balance between interdiction and close air support efforts. Although doctrine may serve well in principle, no air-ground program can succeed without the cooperation and goodwill of air and ground commanders and their staffs. Given sufficient resources, people who will work together toward a commonly shared goal can turn theory into effective practice. Assessing a later war, General Quesada put it succinctly: You can have all the doctrine you want, but unless you have people, commanders, to implement those doctrines, you might as well throw
your doctrines away.55 Generals Weyland and Patton knew this. Theirs was a partnership founded on mutual trust, respect, and a common mission-directed
interest. That is the basic lesson from the Second World War for tactical air power. It is a lesson worth remembering.Air Power for Pattons Army
316
Click to expand...

Log in or Sign up

Air Power for Patton's Army: The 19th Tactical Air Command in the Second World War

Strasser Banned

Share This Page

Log in or Sign up

Air Power for Patton's Army: The 19th Tactical Air Command in the Second World War

Strasser Banned

Share This Page

Useful Searches