Your Honours, I refer you to the 2008 case, the District of Columbia v Hella. Whilst the finding 1) found that the state could not stop a citizen from owning a weapon "in common use at the time", pursuant of course that the person suffers no mental illness or is a felon, but part 2) of the findings explicitly say, that like most rights, the second amendment is not unlimited, that it finds support for the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons, and of laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Thank you your Honours
Then there's a more recent 2016 SCOTUS decision: PER CURIAM. The Court has held that “the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding,” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 582 (200, and that this “Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States,” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 750 (2010)
Then there is no justification for banning AR type rifles. Rifles that make up 20% of rifle sales are not unusual weapons. To me that indicates common use at this time.
The AR platform is about as common as Air. There are Millions of them out there, not counting the ones newly made with no serial numbers. The Ghost guns.
No firearm currently on the legal market qualifies as being dangerous and unusual. Such was addressed in the followup Caetano ruling when the state of Massachusetts tried to utilize the "dangerous and unusual" standard to prohibit the private ownership of electronic stunning devices. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-10078_aplc.pdf The Supreme Judicial Court’s holding that stun guns may be banned as “dangerous and unusual weapons” fares no better. As the per curiam opinion recognizes, this is a conjunctive test: A weapon may not be banned unless it is both dangerous and unusual. Because the Court rejects the lower court’s conclusion that stun guns are “unusual,” it does not need to consider the lower court’s conclusion that they are also “dangerous.” See ante, at 1–2. But make no mistake—the decision below gravely erred on both grounds. As to “dangerous,” the court below held that a weapon is “dangerous per se” if it is “‘designed and constructed toproduce death or great bodily harm’ and ‘for the purpose of bodily assault or defense.’ ” 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692 (quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby , 380 Mass. 296, 303, 402 N. E. 2d 1051, 1056 (1980)). That test may be appropriate for applying statutes criminalizing assault with a dangerous weapon. See ibid. , 402 N. E. 2d, at 1056. But it cannot be used to identify arms that fall outside the Second Amendment. First, the relative dangerousness of a weapon is irrelevant when the weapon belongs to a class of arms commonly used for lawful purposes. See Heller, supra, at 627 (contrasting “‘dangerous and unusual weapons’” that may be banned with protected “weapons . . . ‘in common use at the time’”). Second, even in cases where dangerousness might be relevant, the Supreme Judicial Court’s test sweeps far too broadly. Heller defined the “Arms” covered by the Second Amendment to include “‘anything that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.’” 554 U. S., at 581. Under the decision below, however, virtually every covered arm would qualify as “dangerous.” Were there any doubt on this point, one need only look at the court’s first example of “dangerous per se” weapons: “firearms.” 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692. If Heller tells us anything, it is that firearms cannot be categorically prohibited just because they are dangerous. 554 U. S., at 636. A fortiori, stun guns that the Common wealth’s own witness described as “non-lethal force,” Tr. 27, cannot be banned on that basis. The entire argument on the part of yourself was undone by the united state supreme court before it was even fully formed in the mind of yourself.
