Running Newsticker for the War in Ukraine

Westerners, in their safety far from the front, should not be less determined than Ukrainians who are actually fighting and dying.

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 16, 2024

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine has taken steps to address its manpower shortages, but delays and insufficiencies in Western military aid to Ukraine continue to limit its ability to generate effective combat units that can defend critical areas and contest the theater-wide initiative.
• Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has forced Russia to redirect some resources from Ukraine to defend in Russia but that Ukraine still needs sufficient resources and Western permission to strike military targets in Russia to mitigate the theater-wide strain on Ukrainian forces.
• Russia continues to build out its long-term military capacity by gradually increasing the size of its armed forces.
• Iran is simultaneously setting conditions to build a nuclear weapon while continuing to signal its willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the West.
• Select Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials continue to face corruption charges as the Russian military leadership is undertaking a wider effort to root out corruption in the MoD.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recaptured territory in the area as of September 16. Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kursk salient.
• Ukrainian forces regained territory near Kharkiv City and Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces advanced near Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
• Russia reportedly continues to coerce migrants to fight in the Russian military. . . . .

 

Are you responding to a post or just practicing writing phrases?What post are you responding to?

 

Russian information operations continue at a high tempo.

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17, 2024

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office opened an investigation into another case of apparent Russian abuse and execution of a Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW).
• Leaked documents outlining large-scale Kremlin information operation campaigns targeting Ukraine and the West continue to demonstrate the Kremlin's commitment to leveraging its global information instruments to advance Moscow’s interests using social media.
• Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Iran for an unannounced visit following recent visits to Syria and North Korea amid ongoing Russian efforts to secure military cooperation and support from non-Western allies.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in Moscow.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 17 that Russia continues to recruit citizens from Syria to fight in Ukraine. . . .

 

This ISW excerpt may be pertinent here at PF.
Leaked documents outlining large-scale Kremlin information operation campaigns targeting Ukraine and the West continue to demonstrate the Kremlin's commitment to leveraging its global information instruments to advance Moscow’s interests using social media. Meta, which owns Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, banned Russian state media outlet Russia Today (RT) and "other related entities" on September 17 for "foreign interference activity."[10] The US State Department announced sanctions on September 13 against entities and individuals connected with RT, which the State Department accused of engaging in information operations, covert influence, and military procurement efforts for the Kremlin by targeting states in Europe, Africa, and North and South America.[11] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) "Schemes" investigative project analyzed thousands of leaked documents that German and Estonian outlets previously received that outline the work of the Russian "Social Design Agency" (SDA) company, which the US Department of Justice (DoJ) recently announced as part of the Kremlin's "Doppelganger" complex malign influence operations.[12] The "Schemes" project reported that the SDA has distributed fake official documents, including fabricated orders from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi, as part of its self-described efforts to "discredit the military-political leadership of Ukraine and demoralize the [Ukrainian] Armed Forces." The SDA reportedly created fake documents allegedly from European government entities, fake news stories allegedly from European outlets, and anti-Ukrainian memes that spread widely on social media. ISW continues to assess that Russia is continuing its efforts to develop capabilities to use information operations on social media platforms to trigger kinetic activity and conduct election interference, destabilization measures, and sanctions evasion schemes.[13]

 

A successful Ukrainian drone attack and another corruption arrest highlighted the day in Russia.

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 18, 2024

Click here to read the full report
Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a successful drone strike against a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast on September 18.
• Continued Ukrainian strikes against rear Russian logistics facilities within Russia will generate wider operational pressures on the Russian military beyond the individual destruction of ammunition stockpiles and logistics facilities.
• Russian authorities arrested the head of the Central Military District (CMD)'s armor service on September 18 on suspicion of receiving a large bribe, marking yet another corruption case against a high-ranking Russian military official since the April 2024 appointment of Andrei Belousov as Russian Defense Minister.
• An unsuccessful armed assault against several offices of Russia's largest online retailer Wildberries in Moscow City highlights the fragility of Russia's domestic stability.
• Armenian officials continue to criticize the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) amid worsening bilateral relations between Armenia and Russia.
• Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova condemned Israel for simultaneously detonating thousands of pagers belonging to Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) members across Lebanon and Syria on September 17, signaling Russia's continued rhetorical alignment with Iran's Axis of Resistance against Israel.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Glushkovsky Raion west of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian assaults in and west of the salient. Russian forces regained positions within the salient.
• Russian forces recently advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, within Toretsk, southwest of Donetsk City, and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian State Duma announced on September 18 that it approved a bill in its first reading that proposes releasing Russian servicemembers serving in Ukraine from criminal punishment associated with cases actively being tried in Russian courts. . . . .

 

Very good video from William Spaniel on the latest developments in the Kursk region and the various tactical options available to both sides. The intro covers the backstory but then he quickly moves on to the current situation. (Its only about 10 minutes long BTW.)

 

The Pootster fears that mobilization would threaten his regime's stability.

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 19, 2024

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly declined a request from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to offset Russian losses by declaring another mobilization wave in spring 2024 likely to avoid political costs associated with involuntary reserve call-ups. Putin has since remained committed to his crypto mobilization campaign, constraining Russia's mobilization potential.
• Mobilization in Russia remains unlikely in the near to medium term due to Putin’s personal fear that mobilization is a direct threat to his regime’s stability.
• Russian authorities have reportedly tasked Russian forces with pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and establishing a "buffer zone" into Ukrainian border areas along the international border with Russia in northeastern Ukraine by the end of October — significant undertakings that the Russian military is very unlikely to achieve in such a short period of time.
• The Kremlin continues to signal its commitment to improving Russian drone operations in Ukraine and drone production capabilities amid efforts to offset the social and economic impacts of a protracted Russian war effort.
• Putin claimed that Russia must ensure that there are "no barriers" to the movement of Russian citizens between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad Oblast.
• The reported transfer of Indian artillery shells through European intermediaries to Ukraine is reportedly generating tensions within the Russian-Indian relationship.
• The European Parliament called on member states to lift restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided long-range systems to strike military objects in Russia.
• Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kharkiv City, Svatove, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated during a meeting on the development of the Russian Armed Forces on September 18 that the Kremlin aims to improve Russia's federal-level training system. . . . .

The Kremlin and the Russian MoD notably shocked Russian society with the declaration of partial mobilization in late September 2022, and Putin likely seeks to avoid societal backlash in response to a new mobilization wave at this time.[8] . . . .

 

Russians seem to have aware of the threat of a Ukrainian incursion into Kursk, but took no action.

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 20, 2024


Click here to read the full report with maps
Key Takeaways:

• European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced two new loan mechanisms worth up to 45 billion euros (roughly $50 billion) and 35 billion euros (roughly $39 billion) respectively during a visit to Kyiv on September 20.
• Russian authorities were reportedly aware of the threat of a future Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in the months leading up to August 2024 but failed to take adequate steps to address such a threat.
• These documents support ISW's recent assessment that Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise during the incursion into Kursk Oblast despite Russian authorities' reported awareness of the possibility of an incursion.
• Russian officials attempted to use a meeting with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to legitimize Russia's occupation of Ukraine and promote false narratives about alleged Ukrainian human rights abuses.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Kreminna, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk, and Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in Vovchansk and Siversk.
• Russian state media is increasingly emphasizing the participation of foreign nationals in the Russian war effort in Ukraine, likely to reassure domestic audiences that Russia continues to recruit sufficient manpower and will not need to declare another mobilization wave. . . .

 

The Ukrainians keep finding targets.

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 21, 2024

Click here to read the full report
Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted another successful drone strike against Russian missile and ammunition storage facilities as well as a mobile radar system in Russia overnight on September 20 to 21.
• The Kremlin appears to be reorganizing Russia's decentralized, regional volunteer recruitment campaigns into a federal effort, indicating that Russia is struggling to meet the manpower demands of its war in Ukraine despite previous claims that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast caused a spike in Russia's volunteer recruitment.
• The Russian military leadership and government are continuing to reduce the class of semi-independent Russian military innovators, specialists, and irregular commanders to advance force centralization objectives, maintain the offensive tempo in Donetsk Oblast, and compensate for personnel shortages.
• Iran reportedly did not send mobile launchers for the Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles it recently supplied to Russia, likely due to a decision to prioritize sending additional missiles over bulky and easily replaceable launchers.
• Russian officials have designated 47 countries as having opposing and dangerous moral attitudes to Russia, highlighting that the Kremlin is reviving a Soviet-era tactic and mindset that defines a clear ideological division in the world.
• Russian milblogger analyses of Russia’s war in Ukraine continue to suggest that the Kremlin perceives Western commitment to Ukraine as feeble.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces advanced north of Kharkiv City and near Kupyansk, Kreminna, Tortesk, and southwest of Donetsk City.
• The Kremlin has not fully suppressed localized protests organized by wives of Russian mobilized servicemen since declaring partial mobilization on September 21, 2022. . . . .

 

The Russians are running out of palatable choices.

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 22, 2024

Click here to read the full report
Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's September 18 strike against a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast reportedly destroyed enough Russian munitions to affect Russian operations in the coming months.
• The Kremlin is reportedly reconsidering the effectiveness of nuclear saber-rattling as part of its efforts to influence the ongoing Western policy debate about supporting Ukraine and specifically permitting Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons against military objects in Russia.
• Satellite imagery of damage at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast captured on September 21 suggests that the Russian military recently conducted an unsuccessful RS-28 "Sarmat" nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test.
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on September 21 that Ukraine will increase its production of drones by "several times" in 2025 in order to maintain Ukraine's quantitative superiority over Russian drone production.
• Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced on September 22 that Russia will not participate in Ukraine's second peace summit later in 2024 or in any "such summits."
• Russia is reportedly expanding intelligence operations in Mexico to undermine the United States and support for Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Svatove.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, southwest of Donetsk City, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
• A Ukrainian officer in a drone crew stated on September 22 that the Russian military command is forcing soldiers to dig trenches at Russian positions in unspecified areas of Ukraine without weapons and sometimes without armor, helmets, or military uniforms. . . .

The Washington Post, citing officials close to senior Russian diplomats, stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be realizing that Russian nuclear threats are starting to lose their power over Western officials and that Putin may be developing an unspecified more nuanced and limited informational response to future Western approval of long-range strikes into Russia.[4] An unnamed Russian official claimed that Russian officials have realized that nuclear threats "don't frighten anyone," and a Russian academic with close ties to senior Russian diplomats claimed that Russia's partners in the "Global South" are dissatisfied with Russia's nuclear threats. ISW cannot independently verify the veracity of the Washington Post's sources, but these reports are consistent with ISW's various assessments about how the Kremlin uses nuclear saber-rattling to promote Western self-deterrence and that such statements are not an indication of Russia's willingness to use nuclear weapons.[5] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin's thinly veiled threats of nuclear confrontation are aimed at disrupting and delaying key decision points in Western political discussions about further military assistance to Ukraine.[6] ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.[7] . . . .

 

https://kyivindependent.com/general...-643-750-troops-in-ukraine-since-feb-24-2022/

The below quote from this extract shows that casualties Ukraine is causing Russia seems to be steady. Sounds good but is it enough of a casualty rate to cause a change in Russia’s thinking about continuing the war. I think not but others may believe otherwise.
“Russia has lost in Ukraine since the beginning of its full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, the General Staff of” UAF reported Sept. 23.

This number includes 1,330 casualties Russian forces suffered just over the past day.

According to the report, Russia has also lost 8,784 tanks, 17,252 armored fighting vehicles, 25,102 vehicles and fuel tanks, 18,414 artillery systems, 1,197 multiple launch rocket systems, 949 air defense systems, 369 airplanes, 328 helicopters, 15,699 drones, 28 ships and boats, and one submarine.“

 

Zelensky visits the US while there's reportedly a high-level suicide in Russia.

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 23, 2024
Click here to read the full report with maps
Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in the United States on September 23 and reiterated Ukraine's need for timely and uninterrupted US military assistance.
• The Kremlin continues to publicly signal its disinterest in any peace settlement short of total capitulation of the Ukrainian government and destruction of the Ukrainian state.
• Russian forces conducted glide bomb strikes against Zaporizhzhia City for the first time overnight on September 22 to 23.
• A high-ranking Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) commander reportedly recently committed suicide due to conflicts within his unit's leadership.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Hlyboke, Kupyansk, and Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
• The Russian government informally supported a bill on September 23 that would allow Russian authorities to fine individuals who promote “child-free propaganda,” likely as part of an ongoing Kremlin effort to address Russia’s demographic problem. . . .

A Russian insider source claimed on September 23 that Yuri Annekov, head of the 678th Communications Center of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), committed suicide at the end of last week in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast.[15] The insider source claimed that Annekov had recently complained about insufficient rest and the command's "inadequate" behavior. The insider source claimed that Annekov had served in the VKS for roughly 20 years and had tried to resist the "chaos and disorder" within the VKS that began after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. ISW cannot verify the insider source's claims. . . . .

 

Russian rear-area ammunition depots are sitting ducks.

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 24, 2024
Click here to read the full report with maps
Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Vuhledar amid what appears to be an intensified offensive push near the settlement, but the capture of Vuhledar is unlikely to afford Russian forces any particular operational edge for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian rear ammunition depots demonstrate the extent to which Russian military logistics still benefit from Western-provided sanctuary that secures Russia’s rear.
• Russia continues to expand and leverage its bilateral relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in order to support its war effort in Ukraine.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has failed to appease the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community by downplaying the Russian military command’s responsibility for its insistence on misusing technical specialists in infantry-led frontal assaults in eastern Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of the Kursk Oblast salient.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk and in eastern Toretsk.
• Russian opposition outlet Meduza, citing its own conversations with various unspecified Russian officials close to the Russian Presidential Administration, an interlocutor in the federal government, and regional officials, reported on September 24 that mobilization is a very sensitive topic among Kremlin officials. . . .

 

Ukrainians need to do a lot more duck hunting. Not being glib on purpose. Choking off the Russian ammunition supply will do wonders for the War of the Russian Aggresion. ( against Ukraine).

 

Russian veterans are bringing the war home with them to Russia.

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 25, 2024

click here to read the full report
Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to threaten the possibility of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West in order to exert further control over Western decision-making and discourage the West from allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike military objects in Russia.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for potential strikes against Ukraine’s three remaining operational nuclear power plants ahead of the coming winter, highlighting the Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations and continued commitment to the destruction of the Ukrainian state and its people.
• A Russian company is reportedly collaborating with entities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to develop an attack drone for Russia's war in Ukraine.
• Russia continues to deepen its relationship with Iran's Axis of Resistance, this time reportedly via Iran-brokered talks facilitating Russian missile transfers to Yemen's Houthi rebels.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances in Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces continued to regain positions in Vovchansk.
• Russian forces advanced northwest of Kreminna, in Toretsk, and southeast of Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces reportedly advanced within and around Vuhledar (southwest of Donetsk City) amid continued offensive efforts to seize the settlement.
• Veterans of Russia's war in Ukraine continue to commit crimes upon returning to Russia. . . . .

 

...so 30 miles down the road from me....

.....if anything happens I'll.....

 

https://nationalsecuritynews.com/20...ecial-drone-unit-in-ukraine-out-of-harms-way/

 

Ukraine is getting more aid while the Russians are having trouble getting their combat act together. The Russian military command has been indiscriminately committing specialists to grinding assault operations, partly in support of Russia’s ongoing force centralization efforts and in an attempt to maintain the offensive tempo in eastern Ukraine.

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 26, 2024

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways:

• Germany, France, and the United States announced several immediate and more long-term aid packages for Ukraine on September 25 and 26.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is reportedly struggling to coordinate combat tasks with the Russian military despite having control over the counterterrorism operation against the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued assaults in Kursk Oblast but neither side made further advances in the area.
• Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City and Chasiv Yar and east and southeast of Pokrovsk.
• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command for holding joint military exercises with Laos, arguing that such exercises demonstrate that Russia is not learning from its battlefield experience in Ukraine. . . .

Russian state media continued efforts to absolve the commander of the 87th Separate Rifle Regiment (1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) of any responsibility for the death of two prominent drone operators - Junior Sergeant Dmitry Lysakovsky (alias Goodwin) and Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Gritsai (alias Ernest).[72] Russian milbloggers amplified a clip of Russian propagandist Vladmir Solovyov justifying the commander’s decision to disband Lysakovsky's and Gritsai’s specialized, decentralized drone platoon as ”restoring order” in the brigade.[73] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command had been indiscriminately committing specialists to grinding assault operations, partly in support of Russia’s ongoing force centralization efforts and in an attempt to maintain the offensive tempo in eastern Ukraine.[74] . . . .

 

Russians are slow in combat but quick in propaganda.

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 27, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps
Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced battalion-size Russian mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction on September 26 — the first large Russian mechanized assault along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line since Winter 2024.
• Russian forces may be intensifying their efforts to reach the Oskil River, although Russian advances on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River will likely continue to be relatively gradual.
• The Russian military command has demonstrated that it will likely accept continued gradual gains along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, however.
• The Western Grouping of Forces likely has limited capacity to maintain an intensified offensive effort along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line or conduct effective combat operations that result in more rapid gains.
• Russian authorities appear to be expending a significant amount of effort to influence the Western debate about allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to conduct long-range strikes against military objects in Russia. This Russian effort suggests a deep concern with the operational pressures that such strikes into Russia would generate on Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, although US officials remain hesitant to permit Ukraine to conduct such strikes.
• The benefits of allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided long-range strike systems against Russia may outweigh the risk of Russian retaliation more than Western policymakers are currently considering.
• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers on September 27, likely as part of the ongoing Kremlin effort to coopt Russian milbloggers and downplay recent backlash in the ultranationalist information space over the death of two prominent drone operators.
• The People's Republic of China (PRC) announced a new initiative to draw international support for its alternative peace plan for Ukraine amid increasing cooperation with Russia.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continued to meet with US officials about the war in Ukraine during his visit to the US on September 26 and 27.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued assaults in Kursk Oblast, but neither side made further advances.
• Russian forces recently advanced within and around Toretsk and southeast of Pokrovsk.
• Russian authorities continue to threaten Russian frontline soldiers' ad-hoc communications networks. . . .

 

worth a watch....

General David Petraeus, Partner and Chairman of the Global Institute, KKR
Timothy Snyder, Richard C. Levin Professor of History and Global Affairs, Yale University
Kajsa Ollongren, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands (2022-2024), Member, YES Board
Olha Stefanishyna, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine - Minister of Justice of Ukraine
Annette Kroeber-Riel, Vice President of Government Affairs and Public Policy at Google in Europe

 

The Ukrainians reached out to kill Russia's drone boss. They're getting good intelligence.

Ukraine Conflict Updates

Key Takeaways:

• Western officials continue to highlight efforts by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to support the Russian war effort in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian media reported on September 28 that unspecified Russian resistance movements, in coordination with the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), killed the Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) 924th State Center for Unmanned Aviation Colonel Aleksei Kolomeystev in Koloma, Moscow Oblast.
• The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) strongly condemned on September 28 Israel’s “political assassination” of Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Selydove, and Vuhledar.
• Russia is reportedly implementing legislation that allows Russian authorities to release those accused of crimes from criminal liabilities if the accused signs a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). . . .

 

Ukraine is getting stronger.

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 29, 2024

click here to read the full report
Key Takeaways:

• 
  
  
  • Western countries continue to invest in the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).
  • Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian ammunition depot and missile storage facility near Kotluban, Volgograd Oblast on September 29.
  • The Russian government is reportedly planning to further increase defense spending in 2025, although Kremlin officials appear to be highlighting planned social spending while avoiding discussions of increased defense spending.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, west of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.
  • Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk and Pokrovsk directions. . . .

The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD), in collaboration with the Danish DIB, announced on September 29 the establishment of a defense industrial hub at the Danish embassy in Kyiv with the aim of enhancing Danish-Ukrainian defense industrial cooperation.[1] The Danish initiative aims to support Danish defense and dual-use companies that want to establish production or partnerships with Ukraine. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and Danish Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Troels Lund Poulsen also signed a Letter of Intent on September 29 that pledges Danish financial support for defense production in Ukraine.[2] Denmark will allocate a total of 575 million euros ($641 million) for investment in the Ukrainian DIB, with 175 million euros ($195 million) coming directly from the Danish budget and an additional 400 million euros ($446 million) from profits from frozen Russian assets.[3] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on September 14 that Ukraine will be able to domestically produce $20 billion worth of defense equipment in 2025 if Ukraine receives additional funding from its partners.[4] ISW has assessed the importance of sustained and timely Western military support for Ukraine, particularly Western assistance to develop Ukraine’s DIB, so that Ukraine can become more self-sufficient and reduce its reliance on Western military aid in the long-term.[5] . . . .

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Glushkovsky Raion west of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 29. Geolocated footage published on September 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west and northwest of Veseloye (south of Glushkovo) and likely seized the northwestern part of the settlement.[18] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) with repelling Ukrainian attacks near Veseloye.[19] . . . .