US Counter-Subversion/Terrorism- Operation Phoenix, the Pentagon Papers

Horhey · Oct 11, 2012

Secret CIA Assassination Program: Operation Phoenix, Vietnam War

[video=youtube_share;rWj0jNl2GdQ]http://youtu.be/rWj0jNl2GdQ[/video]

And US planners define "subversion" as "underground propaganda" and so on.

These operations were part of Operation Phoenix in South Vietnam- a CIA Death Squad program comprised of South Vietnamese secret police that assassinated, kidnapped and tortured suspected "Viet Cong infrastructure". Ive discovered much more than this since the last thread but Im showing it now because it defines "passification" and "counter-terror"- terms used often in US counterinsurgency manuals. As is shown here, passification and counter-terrorist organization means "Death Squad" terror.

The Pentagon Papers
Gravel Edition Volume 2

"Re-Emphasis on Pacification: 1965-1967"

1. Lodge at the end of his first tour in Vietnam, defining pacification in his paper proposing Hop Tac:

The first priority after the military have cleared an area is to bring about the selection of an able man for that area, who will in turn go about creating a basically civilian counter-terrorist organization on the "precinct" level, or equivalent thereof . . . Its prime purpose will be, notably with police help, to create security for the local government and free it from all intimidation by going through the precinct with a fine-toothed comb....Once the local government feels safer, it should move energetically to promote public safety for the people; the people should then rally more to the government; and this should create an upward spiral as regards security organization . . . USOM and USIA will support these local "precinct" organizations, will actually work through them, and will seek to make it attractive to be one of those who builds such a counterterrorism precinct organization . . . The military should take special precautions in their operations not to injure in any way the non-combatants. It must also behave itself so well that the people like the Army...."

3. The Assignment of Lansdale:

Handpicked group of about ten experienced counter-subversion/counter terrorism workers under direction of Edward G. Lansdale will be going to Saigon to provide Ambassador Lodge with special operating staff in field of political action both at central level and also in connection with rural programs.

COMMENT: From the beginning, there was misunderstanding over Lansdale's role in Lodge's Embassy. The first cable reflects this. The phrase "countersubversion/counter-terrorism workers," seems to contradict the latter part of the sentence, about "political action." From the start Lodge wanted him to "get pacification going." Thus, less than a month later, Lodge told the President:

I appointed Edward Lansdale, with his complete approval, to be chairman of the U.S. Mission Liaison Group to the newly created Vietnamese governmental body having to do with what we call "pacification," what they call "rural construction," and what means to me socially conscious practical politics, the by-product of which is effective counter-subversion/ terrorism. I thought it was important for all concerned for him to have a definite allocation where he would have the best chance of bringing his talents to bear. I trust that the hopes of some journalists that he is here in an adversarial relationship with existing US agencies will be nipped in the bud by making him the spokesman for the whole US Mission in this particular regard.

Thus, another action which served to strengthen the pacification priority, although its primary reason probably was to get Lansdale working on something other than Saigon politics.

4. Lodge on the Use of U.S. Troops in Pacification:

The presence of American troops does provide the opportunity for thorough pacification of the areas in which they are stationed and full advantage should be taken of this opportunity. It is a very big divident from our investment of men and money. For example, the Third Marine Division has scored impressive successes north, south, and west of Da Nang....If our American troops can emulate this performance (of the protoCAC units) of 60 Americans and 150 Vietnamese, we ought to be a tremendous amount of small unit nighttime effective pacification, and we would be neglecting an opportunity not to use American troops for this purpose, thereby pacifying the country and transforming the ARVN, making it into a much more vital and effective element of Vietnamese society, able at some not too remote date to carry on by themselves within outside help . . . We are already discussing with the Vietnamese the possibility of singling out areas that look like good prospects, that are potentially pretty much over on our side, and then pacifying them so as to get a little smell of across-the-board success in the air . . . I am not ready to say, "What areas would be chosen for pacification, when should the plan be started, what objectives would be best," but hope to be able to do so soon. I am now encouraging General Ky to concentrate GVN efforts and enthusiasm on pacification so that this can have sustained, wholehearted GVN participation . . . Development of popular electoral processes is part of all our current planning for counter subversion/ terrorism in "rural construction (pacification)."
Click to expand...

They organized an election after whiping out all suspected VC sympathizers and terrifying everyone else- the "hearts and minds" component of US counterinsurgency doctrine: CORDS.

Horhey · Oct 12, 2012

Free ebook that's seling for $25.40 on Amazon.

"No book to date conveys the hideousness of the Vietnam War as thoroughly as this one." Publishers Weekly

The Phoenix Program, Douglas Valentine

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US Counter-Subversion/Terrorism- Operation Phoenix, the Pentagon Papers

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