Ideas for Light Infanty Upgrades.

Thanks for the info. I was never a grunt, and the time I did spend in the Army years ago was in ADA units---so this why I'm asking about squad sized patrols.

My guess is that a some 9 person squad would not carry mortars. This would only happen in company or maybe platoon sized patrols, I assume.

From what I can gather, around 60 pounds of gear is what most guys carry in dismounted infanty patrols. I didn't say water was NOT a priority, ammo and water ARE of greatest importance in hot, arid regions. My time spent training during the summer in El Paso and White Sands helped me understand that.

 

Kandahar airfield is not an Air Force base, it's the command and control HQ RC (South)...and FSB...all of ISAF uses it...it's home to 20,000 coalition troops; therefore why should it's security be the exclusive domain of the U.S. Air Force? The lead nation command has rotated between Canada, the Netherlands, and the UK, and only most recently been assumed solely by the U.S.

Also the current method of (PRT) team selection is an ad hoc approach taken to address the inadequacy of the Army to staff them.
PRTs ideally should be self-contained units, with substantially more preparation.

The Navy and Air Force continue to lead PRTs in counterinsurgencies, and ideally they should be built around 2-year tours, with a minimum of 6 months cultural and language training and 18 months in country.

It takes at least 6 months before the new team has become acclimated to a province or district. Currently, PRTs train for 3 months and spend 9 months in country. By the time the unit has gotten to know the people... as well as the geography... they are sent home and a new team arrives. Each new team has to ramp up and begin the process all over again.

The core problem is the Army's inability to staff them...

 

60lbs is actually probably a lot less than most guys are carrying. The average for any kind of long range patrol would be in the 70-100lb range.

 

I was talking about immediately after the invasion in 2001. My point was that everyone's on the same team and works together. The Air Force and Navy are providing personnel because the wars haven't been anywhere near as demanding for those branches.

Good luck trying to get anyone to do a 2 year tour. That's just not realistic. The problem you describe with PRTs isn't only theirs, every combat unit overthere, particularly the ones that train and work with Afghans (which is almost all of them) are hurt by the quick turnover rates.

If you don't think the Air Force should have to help pick up some of the slack, then maybe they should cut Air Force numbers by about 5,000 and increase the army's by that much. Or, the Air Force could play ball with everyone else, loan out the guys it has who are qualified to do the job, then take them back after the war.

 

they should cut Air Force numbers by about 5,000?
They already did, and then some.

In the end of 2005, Air Force reduced its numbers by 16,000 and the Navy, by 7,900. The Army set up a "blue to green" program recruiting former airman and sailors to join the Army, which was expanding it's ranks at the time.

These counter-insurgency wars are winding down, the Navy and Air Force should get back to their core missions...

 

Well, before my 5 years in ADA, I spent 10 years as a grunt. And you have to understand, there are 2 very different situations you are talking about here.

Generally, mortars are only "carried" when a unit is moving in to occupy a position. Once they get to that position, they settle in and the patrols then move out, with the mortars making the unit positiion essentially a mini-firebase. And the patrols then generally only go out to the range of their weapons. In the case of a Company sized element, their 60mm mortar has a range of around 3.5 km. For a Battalion sized unit, their 81mm mortar reaches out 6km.

Generally the mortars and grunt platoons "leapfrog" on unit movement situations. The mortar sets up, and the company moves out the the limit of their weapon, then settles in and builds up quick defenses while the mortar section (along with the other heavy weapons) moves up to occupy that position. Then they leapfrog like this over and over again, each time moving forward about 3 klicks. And many times the units actually assign a HMMWV to each mortar team, which works in combination with one of the M-2 teams to provide greater firepower (both direct and indirect). It all depends on the situation and the unit SOP.

And no, on patrols they are not carrying around all that much weight. Lots of water, about a day supply of food, and lots of ammo for their weapons (and maybe each with a drum of belted 5.56 for the SAW. That is really it. Total weight of everything is probably around 60 lbs, including water, body armor, weapons, grenades, ammo, etc. But the weight is pretty evenly distributed. They are not going around with all their gear and another 60 lbs in a pack.

The IOTV (newest body armor) is actually pretty nice. With trauma plates, a large does weigh in at around 35 pounds, but you hardly notice the weight because it is distributed so well. It is much more comfortable and easier to wear then the old IBA, and light years beyond the old PASGT that I was issued in the 1980's (and the even older 1970s era Flak Vests I was originally issued).

 

The mission of the United States Air Force is to fly, fight and win...in air, space and cyberspace.

The core mission of the United States Army includes stability operations on the ground.

It's in the field manual for operations, FM 3-07 released in 2008.

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf

Stability operations consist of five lines of effort, including: civil security,
civil control, support to governance, provision of essential services, and support to infrastructure and economic development.

 

Part of this to me is actually misleading.

Once you outfit somebody with their uniform, boots, helmet, IOTV, water, weapons and ammo, they do have on over 60 lbs. But the way this was worded to me read more like the implication was that they had 60+ pounds in their packs. Most grunts can have 60-80 lbs in personal gear strapped directly to them, with little problem. And yea, having all of that and another 60-100 lbs is a pain in the butt, but we knew that it was easy to get rid of also if needed.

 

I guess we need to cut them even more then if the we're not getting enough bang for our buck from the Air Force. When there's a job to be done it gets done. I was an Infantryman, but at one time or another I was a cook, driver, medic, baby sitter, mechanic, accountant, armorer etc. etc. Think I ever complaind to someone that I wasn't doing the job I trained for?

 

Sure, you're not assaulting with 100lbs on your pack. I'd still say that at the bare minimum in Iraq we were at 60-70lbs. The new plate carriers have cut this down a bit. Still, when you're up in the mountains on a 3 day patrol you're going to be carrying at least 80lbs, which takes a toll on the body, even if you can drop 20 or 30 of it off in a pinch.

 

If doing an all day foot patrol, up to 12 or 15 hours, would most guys still carry 20 lbs more than the regular 60?

 

Yeah you Marines win wars all by yourselves I'm sure......

We're talking about one of the most important jobs in a counter-insurgency. Stability operations. A job which requires extensive knowledge
of the culture, language, and geography of the indigenous people you're trying to assist. I've already spelled it out...they take an airman or sailor with no specialized
training in this job and in 3 months try to insruct him and teach combat skills...then throw them in the field for 9 months and by the time they get an understanding
of the job and the people they are trying to assist, they get sent home.

It's the Army's responsibility to staff these positions with Army personnel, as stability operations on the ground is part of their core mission...
did you bother to read FM 3-07 I provided?

The Navy and Air Force have been leading provincial reconstruction teams for years now...because the Army is inadequate at staffing these positions.

You're failing to understand the core missions of each service branch obviously..so there's really no point in conversing further.
You think stability operatons is the equivalent of fixing a starter solenoid on a HMMWV.

 

From 2006...


Twelve provincial reconstruction teams, or PRTs, have been training here (Ft. Bragg) since January. The PRTs are from the Air Force, Army and Navy. They will step in and help enable the authority of the central government of Afghanistan.

“The Air Force has done a magnificent job leading their teams,” said Army Col. David Boslego, 4th Brigade 78th Division commander. Six of the PRT teams are led by Air Force officers and six are led by Naval officers.

These are Air Force and Navy led PRT teams...in what should be Army doctrine...

The Iraq war was ramping up and it's obvious Afghanistan was put on the back burner...so the Air Force and Navy stepped in...this I understand.

The only thing the Colonel in the previous story I posted earlier in the thread...is that it is time the Air Force got back to it's core mission..and the Army assume
responsibility for theres.

The Air Force should not be fighting wars on the ground.

Combat troops are already out of Iraq and by the end of 2014 they will be out of Afghanistan.

 

Stability Operations Now Part of Army’s Core Mission...perhaps Army brass needs a reminder.

 

I'll ignore your childish comment about the Marine Corps since it's obviously meant to provoke another school yard argument.

Provisional reconstruction teams aren't core units inherent to the army or any other branch. Their ad hoc units with a mix of civilian and military personnel. The same with MIT and PIT teams. These aren't units organic to the Army or Marine Corps. They just pull guys from a mix of different units to staff them. The wars in Iraq/Afghan demanded these teams so they have made them temporarily. None of these guys get special training. They get pulled from their units, spend a few months doing a work up, then deploy. A sailor or airmen tossed into the same training regime is going to come out just about the same. The only difference is that the Army/Marine guys are probably more familiar with ground combat operations, which aren't that important because PRTs are always protected by other units.

I think stability operations are a mission that none of the branches are inherently designed for but have been drafted to do because our government has decided we need to be over there.

 

So the Army has adjusted to meet the new demands of the world. Has the Air Force? Have they realized that the immediate future of warfare isn't going to involve B-1s and F-22s conducting massive strikes? The Air Force needs to adjust to the new demands of the world.

 

Precisely...and they need to be...and it's the U.S. Army's job to develop them.

These are called "in lieu of tasks"..selectin an airman or sailor for these jobs...
and the U.S. Army has over a decade of experience between Iraq and Afghanistan to formalize a training program and instill from the bottom up....
4th generation warfare...which includes stability opertions...so that everyone from the Private to the 4-Star General understands it's no longer about
killing people and breaking their stuff.

3 months is not sufficient time to learn this...it's the equivalent of training a flyer in 3 months and sending them off to combat...
The human element is vital in asymmetrical warfare...

All I'm hearing is...we need new rifles...and a discussion of infantry load outs...

It's the same old school thinking that led us to these protracted never ending insurgency wars...
We can't break and kill stuff to achieve victory in these global hotstops..and the training should reflect that....

It's an important and vital job...why treat it like a "jack of all trades" anyone can learn it on the fly....

3 months of instruction?

That's inadequate.

6 months at minimum.

Seriously, is Afghanistan goivg well at the moment?
We're training Afghani soldiers who turn around and murder their instructors...

We will be leaving Afghanistan ultimately...as we found it.

A fundamental approach to fighting needs to include stabilty operations. The United States has the most powerful military in the World
and after 12 plus years of war in Afghanistan, we will most likely end combat operations as we found Afghanistan in 2001... a nation incapable
of sustaining a central government.

I don't see how giving each soldier a more modernized, lighter and deadlier rifle would have changed anything between October, 2001 and
August, 2012.

Perhaps more adequate training in stability operations should be looked into.

 

Woah Woah Woah

Average Infantry units devote EXTENSIVE time to fighting counter-insurgency operations and with some security/rebuilding operations. This is what 90% of my training consisted of. Mushroom, who was an Infantrymen before the wars, learned and practiced some very different things.

Provisional reconstruction teams are suppossed to work at the higher level. They work with the heads of local governments/cities in an entire region. The Infantry units lock down their AOs, which may be a city, a few towns, or a couple dozen villages depending on size. These units work on providing security and training the local security forces. The BN also usually works with local government leaders. This is the level where the rubber hits the road.

On top of that a BN will usually have a MIT/PIT team (military/police transition team) with some special training. These guys are drawn right from the BN and given a little extra training. They're usually embedded right into security forces and train/interact with them. Then you have CAG units that come and work on things like sanitation, health care, infrastructure, and a bunch of other stuff that combat units aren't really designed to do. THEN, above that you have the PRT teams who work in a bigger area with more broad responsibilites. They meet with mayors/governors and really implement the larger broader plan. It's at this level that civilians get into the mix and it's at this level that the training is lacking or personnel are missing. A lot of the stuff at that level is State Department stuff. State brings in a bunch of Engineers, MDs, Phds etc. to handle things. The military guys act as liasons and add their own expertise to the mix. This level is kind of temporary gray area that blends military/civilian areas of expertise. I don't think at that level it really matters what branch guys are. Soldiers aren't taught political science, infrastructure planning, health planning etc. any more than Airmen (and shouldn't be). What they do bring to the table is an understanding of the military and military planning, something that airmen and sailors can do just as well.

In essence you're saying that the PRT job doesn't belong to the Air Force, when in fact it doesn't belong to the Army or any other branch either; It belongs to civilian experts with officers from whatever branch to fill in the holes and be liasons. I think military liasons at Embassies are probably a decent comparison. My understanding is that officers there can be of any branch type but are expected to bridge the gap between military and politics.

 

You're right, it's not about the bombs on the ground. It's also not about Infantrymen knowing how to beat counter-insurgencys. They already know how to do that and have been doing it extremely well. They did it in Iraq and in Afghanistan very successfully. These guys have an incredible understanding and indepth training on these types of operations. But this doesn't matter. Counter-insurgencys are won at the political level. The U.S. has the "ass kicking" power to defeat the Taliban 10,000 times over. What they don't have is the political skills/power to rebuild Afghanistan and provide a stable government that can provide security and cause the population to turn against the insurgents (as they did in Iraq). The same held true in Vietnam. Winning or losing Afghanistan really comes down to the politicians and Generals. It's about broad strategic planning. We could put 10,000,000 Green Beret quality soldiers in Afghanistan hunting the Taliban 24/7 and it wouldn't "win" the war. It's about the political stability of the country.

All the stuff you claim the Infantry needs to learn has already largely been mastered by the U.S. military. But none of that stuff matters if the higher level stuff isn't put in place.

 

The airman I highlighted appeared to be part of a security team on convoys.
While weapons training is being incorporated in Air Force basic military training, it is nothing like the Army or Marines. Going beyond just these PRT teams,
I believe 3 months of combat skills training is woefully inadequate, for anyone tasked to security duties or any sort of team that may deal with direct combat.

I'll say again the Air Force and let's not forget about the Navy, should get out of the ground fighting business in terms of these "in lieu of" tasks.

Why not take an Army desk clerk along for security, they've had more small arms weapons training than any enlisted airman beyond AF security police.

The Army has it's Reserves and it's National Guard to fall back on with a lot more weapons training.

I don't recall the Air Force utilizing soldiers as part of their aircrews if they are understaffed in a particular area....
it's like with me...I was an Air Force Reservist, with specialized training and experience in one area...intra-theater airlift...even in peacetime, many traditional reservists
spend 50 - 100 days a year drilling and training to be ready when called upon.

I understand what you're saying, why have someone in the services sitting this war out because their particular specialty isn't needed, when they can be utilized in some capacity.

Perhaps the Army should plan accordingly on a contingency basis for future conflicts. Maintain a professional corps of soldiers specialized in stability operations.

It it is part of Army doctrine and the Army did indeed train these airman and sailors, why can't they do the same for their own soldiers who maybe under-utilized?

 

Oh, I know this all to well. As I say, "I was a grunt, and have the knees to prove it".

And yea, have done similar patrols in the jungles of Panama during Jungle Warfare School. It sucked, but it was part of what we signed up for (lol). And I look at the quality of equipment we had then compared to now, and I am still amazed. The only part of the new equipment I generally refuse to use is the backpack. That high backed plastic thing sure can hold a lot of stuff, but it is nowhere near as comfortable as my old ALICE is on an actual forced march.

 

What is "regular"?

On most routine patrols, most of the weight is not really counted. Uniform, weapon, body armor, helmet, ammo, grenades, all this alone weighs in at close to 60 lbs all by itself. But we do not count that, no more then most runners take into consideration of the weight of their shoes. To us, the "weight" only starts to count once you get beyond the absolute miniums.

And yea, we often carry more then that. Maybe this will give an idea.

Back when Marines were generally issued 2 1 quart canteens, I generally carried around an additional 2 2 quart canteens (add around 10 pounds). When I know I am going to be doing hard work in a desert environment now, I normally pull out my CamelBak BFM.



With it I have 2 2 liter bladders, and a 3 liter bladder, in addition to 2 750 ml bottles. And many times I have given water to my buddies who ran out. I also generally carry 3 MREs, a CLS bag, 2 way radio(s), flashlight(s), mirror, GPS, signaling device, reflector belts, Poncho, Poncho liner, 550 cord, and a lot of other gear. I think for normal patrols, I would have around 40 pounds of gear shoved into this pack.

The guys in my platoon often wondered why I packed so much garbage (especially 3-5 reflector belts). But they did not laugh when the platoon sergeant decided to suddenly perform stick lanes. 9 line medivac? Well, out comes my Flight Checklist Binder and the 9 line card. Use the GPS to get coordinates, grease pencil to fill out the card, reflector belts to mark the LZ. Poncho becomes our stretcher, cover the casualty with the poncho liner to help prevent shock. We were ready to evac the casualty within 5 minutes (9 line sent, patient prepped, LZ marked out), when the other squads were still trying to remember what all goes in a 9 line.

We spot an IED. Out comes the GPS and UXO/IED report, mark the location by tossing a reflector belt at it, send up the report.

Need to call in an air strike. Give the approximate coordinates of the target, give our coordinates, use a reflector belt on the ground to let the pilot know we are the good guys and not the target.

The same thing happened when we dug in for night positions. Back of the forward Listening Post I put a reflector belt so we can see where it is located (to prevent friendly fire incidents). At each edge of our arc of fire, put a reflector belt so only we can see it, so we do not fire towards other friendly units. Even place one along a road so it is only visible from our position, then the crew served weapons know exactly where to fire.

I even used one as part of an ambush once. Night was starting to fall, and I placed one inside some brush. "Enemy" patrol came by, saw the belt and started a single envelopment to take out the "position". Once they were seperated we rolled up on the base of fire element from the flank, then wiped out the enveloping element.

By the way, I hate reflector belts. But there are some really usefull ways to use them if you let your imagination run a bit.

Yea, most of the time I never used the stuff I packed (other then MREs and water), but I would rather have it with me and not need it, then need it and have these things back at the base camp.

 

This is a good thing, to provide soldiers with modernized and portable communication capabilities in the field...
However, returning to the OP...who questioned all the other defense spending which seems to neglect the infantry.

The Future Combat Systems, (the U.S. Army's brain child) program has cost American taxpayers...
300,000,000,000.00
That's 300 B...as in Billion dollars ...
A complete boondoggle with little to show for it in terms of operational equipment.
At least these radios appear to have emerged from the program and will be fielded.

$53.9 million for 13,000 radios would be approximately 1.7 F-15E's as the author of the OP seems so concerned we're wasting money on aircraft
and not Army equipment...

Carry on.

The Army recently awarded a $53.9 million contract to General Dymanics C4 Systems for 13,000 AN/PRC-154 Rifleman Radios, a Joint Tactical Radio System designed to connect individual soldiers to the service’s network.

The Rifleman Radio is part of the JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit family of radios that is scheduled to be fielded as part of the Army’s high-tech Capability Set 13. Rifleman radio has turned out to be one of the few success stores to come out of the expensive scrap heap that was Future Combat Systems.

Soldiers raved about the range of the Rifleman Radios at the Network Integration Evaluation. The soldiers also appreciated having the capability to plug in the prototype smartphones the Army is testing into the Rifleman Radio architecture.
The contract brings the number of Rifleman Radios slated to be fielded to the Army up to 19,000, said Fran Jacques, a spokeswoman for GDC4S.

Capability Set 13 is scheduled to be fielded to infantry brigade combat teams in October with the first sets going to the 10th Mountain Division. The set features a package of network equipment and software designed to connect individual soldiers and small units to the Army’s tactical network.

The Rifleman Radio gives soldiers voice and data capabilities. It can be connected to a ruggedized smartphone so soldiers can send and receive emails, graphs and tactical maps

 

FCS was the general program title for almost all Army Ground replacement equipment, both personal and vehicles. For the individual soldier, it covered everything from newer uniforms, body armor, heating/cooling systems, and other things.

For vehicles, it was to design replacements for the increasingly antiquated 30+ year old M1 and M2 vehicles.

It was an attempt by the Army to try and bring as many of the concepts together as possible, and to work on them jointly instead of widely seperated teams that did not know what the other teams were doing.

I talked with some of the guys in the Evaluation Team, and they all raved about what was expected to start coming out in the next few years. They said the mock-ups of the new vehicles looked both better and safer then what they had been using. Specifically they mentioned to me the Stryker, which was a great vehicle, but a potential death trap to get out of in the event of an emergency.

But nothing has really changed. They simply killed all the old programs, and restarted new ones that are now widely scattered. One of the largest problems was that most people can't seem to grasp that it takes on average 10-20 years for a major piece of equipment to go from a drawing board to fielded product (what became the Abrams started as the MBT-70 program in 1965, the Bradley started as the MICV-65 in 1965). Both vehicles were finally fielded in 1980 (M1) and 1981 (M2), 15+ years later.

So now instead of getting better vehicles starting to roll out in around 2020, they are starting all over again, and we might see something by 2025-2030.

At least LandWarNet is also moving forward, another major part of the FCS program. And the newer versions of the Blue Force Tracker that were to be part of FCS is now being designed jointly with the Marines and British Army.

 

I actually mis-spoke, FCS would have cost upwards of $300 billion prior to it's cancellation.
As it is, the Army had invested an estimated $1.5 billion.

Yet another boondoggle.
The V-22 tilt-rotor (now operational) has been on the drawing board, in one shape or another since the early 1960's.

The X-22 for example.


Success?
There are success stories out there.

Designed and built within 2 years...from drawing board to testing to operational.

Design, produced and deployed...quickly.

The U-2 high altitude spy plane.


An airframe still in use today, (though the avionics and sensor pods are modernized) still operational as I type thiis.

It is possible to compress the time from R&D, to testing, to field operational.