Why would liberals hate Tucker Carlson?

WARMMONGERS VS THE AMERICAN RIGHT


If the American right had been as skeptical toward "our foreign policy establishment back around 1963 that it has today, we might never have allowed the Vietnam War to have become a decade-long quagmire."

How many times do we have to see the same movie before we can anticipate how it ends?

Prior to fighting two major wars at the same time, in 1940, our debt was at less than 45% of GDP. Now it's over a hundred percent. What if we have to fight a major war against a major power? We can't afford to go adventuring. Interestingly, it's the war mongers who also show no appetite for cutting Federal Spending. Following the money, I think it will become clear that before they are warmongers, they are profiteers.

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This is a bipartisan issue. McCain was never against a war. Lindsey Graham was always glued to the hip of McCain. Has Lindsey ever been against a war? Any war?

This was part of the split between the Base and the GOP establishment, that the Base won with the ascension of the Orange Miracle, who was the first president in a generation not to start a new war.

When "Vladimir Putin sent Russian forces into Crimea in 2014, then-Secretary of State John Kerry professed bewilderment that such imperial aggression could happen in the modern age. It was like something out of “the 19th century.” Kerry’s reaction to Putin’s recent invasion of Ukraine was equally baffled, as the patrician American diplomat lamented that the war would distract Putin from working with him on climate change. Common to both reactions was the astonishment that the material calculations and preoccupations of Western democracies might be blown away by a resurgence of old-fashioned tyrannical ambition."

https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/...qjX8wCLAY6afgjPhtptutvi8uM98ByZuCnAyNFy6DIsu8

In the midst of the comparative peacefulness and prosperity of the democracies those blessed with such freedom and security must maintain eternal vigilance, well equipped to promptly repel the attempted predations of wolves like Putin and Xi Jinping that are "always prowling just beyond the perimeter of free self-government. Putin’s latest aggression—this time aimed at the very heart of Europe—may have the salutary effect of shocking us into looking the threat of tyranny straight in the face."

We interpret political motivation and foreign policy through the assumption of economic self-interest. We pretend that those that "aspire to tyranny and conquest are in the grip of “vainglorious” delusions and must be brought to realize that what they really want is safety, wealth, and the chance to enjoy it as they see fit."

"We naively suppose that tyrants like Putin need only be persuaded that, like all states, they want a bigger piece of the economic pie. Once they realize that the risks of going to war—the material destruction and loss of lives—far outweigh the opportunity for profit, even the scariest seeming tyrants will see that they are better off peacefully negotiating for greater economic advantage."

This theories failure repeatedly in the face of "leaders who are willing to risk everything for the prospect of honor and victory, regarding these ambitions as the stuff of historical greatness. The last century witnessed the rise of history’s most tyrannical aggressors, including Stalin, Hitler, Mao, and Khomeini. In every case, rationalist-oriented Western policymakers thought that the economic self-interest of tyrants would deter them from all-out war. When Britain and France offered to give Hitler the Sudetenland, they believed this offer would slake his hunger for all of Czechoslovakia and give the Czechs a reprieve. Instead, it encouraged him to further aggression. Similarly, hopes for peaceful coexistence and détente with the Soviet Union were shattered by Brezhnev’s invasion of Afghanistan. As it turned out, the Soviet Union being an economic basket case was not as important to its leadership as restoring revolutionary elan through foreign conquest, as had been done when the Red Army rolled over Eastern Europe after World War II."

"Although Putin’s ambition is to restore Russian control over its former Warsaw Pact captive states, he in no way wishes to restore the Soviet regime itself. Russian history has long been riven by a cultural conflict between those who look to Europe, the West, and the Enlightenment as the path that Russia should follow and those who are loyal to Slavic nationalism, which is deeply religious and not interested in economic prosperity. Putin is in the Slavophile camp. Putin believes that Soviet communism was an import of European rationalism that poisoned the authentic Russian soul."

While "Soviet communist regime will never be restored, Slavophilic populism—a national tribalism extending to all Slavic peoples including Ukraine, Poland, and the Balkans, who must be gathered back into the Russian fold", could easily be Putin motivation.

We need to consider that "Putin’s grand geopolitical map for Russia and Russia’s salvational role in the world begins with its gradual recovery of its lost Slavic brethren in Ukraine and Moldova."

"Putin's aims are for Russia to be honored, feared and powerful. He is no Hitler or Ahmadinejad, willing to pursue his imperial ambitions to the point where he and Russia risk going down in flames in a final Götterdämmerung, like Hitler in his bunker. But Putin is ready to go a very great deal further in pursuing his ambitions than elected democratic leaders are—a fact that he knows, and which he believes gives him a key advantage in his confrontation with the West. He is willing to march up to the very edge of a general war in Europe, or perhaps even cross that line, and he is willing to put the Russian people through extreme material deprivation rather than settle for a slice of the pie as measured out by foreign powers. Honor and national pride come first. That is why we need to remind ourselves over and over again that the ambition to tyrannize and a lust for honor at the expense of material self-interest are unalterable features of human nature."

This thought system is not unique to Putin. "If some Russian officer put a bullet in Putin’s head today, the problem of an aggressive and anti-Western Russia would remain. This requires some much larger strategic thinking than merely whether NATO should be expanded."

Certainly NATO should be 5 years into the bristling expansion that Trump advocated, and with which, Ukraine very likely would not be under hostile invasion.