The Alternative Ukraine Thread

Yes. Either would be better than either Trump or Biden.

 

I'm not keeping score, but you forgot Korea.
We went to Iraq the first time to uphold international order. We went the second time to remove Hussein.

 

Well it's not a matter of better, it's a matter of replacing the top won't make a difference to America's decline.

 

There is no American decline, only the decline of some Americans.

 

.....few more T-72 tanks on their way to Ukraine from Macedonia


They also sent 4 SU-25s...they're pretty crappy planes and probably in an even worse condition.....but every little helps as they say.

 

Russian Offensive Campaign ...

Key Takeaways

• 
  
  • Ukraine is likely seizing the strategic initiative and forcing Russia to reallocate forces and reprioritize efforts in response to Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.
  • Russian forces attempted to advance northwest of Izyum.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted a series of localized counterattacks between Izyum and Slovyansk and regained positions in a number of settlements.
  • Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast and south of Bakhmut.
  • Russian troops continued attempts to advance on Pisky and conducted a limited ground attack southwest of Donetsk City.
  • Russian forces continued to transfer equipment and personnel to northeastern Kherson and western Zaporizhia Oblasts.

. . . Russian forces launched unsuccessful assaults on Ukrainian positions near the Inhulets River on August 3 and August 4. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Bilohirka, Lozove, and Andriivka (on the eastern Inhulets River bank), and in the direction of Bila Krynytsya (on the western Inhulets River bank).[23] Russian forces are likely continuing offensive operations in the area to suppress the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River and disrupt Ukrainian threats to Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along the T2207 highway. Russian forces have intensified their air campaign along the contact line in Kherson Oblast and reportedly launched airstrikes on 17 settlements.[24] Russian forces also continued to shell over 25 settlements along the Kherson Oblast administrative border, fired 60 missiles at Nikopol using Grad MLRS, and unsuccessfully launched Onyx anti-ship missile at Odesa Oblast that exploded in the air.[25]

Russian forces continued to redeploy military personnel and equipment from other axes to defend current Russian positions in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian General Staff Main Operations Deputy Chief Oleksiy Gromov reported that Russian forces transferred three battalion tactical groups (BTGs) that had been operating on the frontline around the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border to northeastern Kherson Oblast.[26] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command added that Russian forces have continued to transfer unspecified elements of the 35th Combined Arms Army (CAA) that have previously fought in Izyum and Kyiv Oblast to northeastern Kherson Oblast.[27] Gromov added that Russian forces also strengthened the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline with one BTG and are replenishing stockpiles of weapons and supplies in Melitopol. Russian forces will likely prioritize the defense of occupied positions north of Melitopol over the frontlines in Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border area. These BTGs and elements of the 35th CAA are unlikely to generate the necessary combat power for further offensive operations given that these units likely experienced significant losses of personnel and equipment on other axes. Gromov also noted that Russian forces are transferring large amounts of military equipment to Kherson Oblast via the Kerch Strait Bridge and are using Crimea as a “bridgehead for stockpiling weapons.“ Gromov stated that Russian forces are also regrouping aviation equipment from the Eastern Military District (EMD) in Crimea, and geolocated social media footage showed the movement of Russian military equipment across the Kerch Strait Bridge.[28]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian GLOCs, positions, and military bases in Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian aviation struck two Russian strongholds in the areas of Blahodatne and Pravdyne, both located northwest of Kherson City.[29] Ukrainian forces have also reportedly destroyed the command post of the Russian 22nd Army Corps during a strike on Chornobaivka, also northwest of Kherson City.[30] Advisor to the Kherson Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Khlan also reported explosions at a Russian ammunition depot in Nova Mayachka (approximately 48km southeast of Kherson City) but did not specify if Ukrainian forces struck the depot.[31] Social media users reported witnessing explosions near the Antonivskyi Railway Bridge, but it is unclear if Ukrainian forces attempted to strike the bridge on August 3.[32] . . .

 

jeezuz.....they're running around like blue arsed flies!! All they're downing is telegraphing their deficiencies by senselessly running up and down the country re-acting to situations rather than controlling them....what a bloody shambles.

 

"No plan of operations reaches with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main force."
--Helmuth von Moltke

 

yeah.....in this case the quote could have just said "No plan of operations" 'bout sums it up

 

The Russians have been fumbling ever since they failed in their initial attempt at a lightning capture of Kyiv and decapitation of Ukraine's government.

 

...another bad day at the office....



Link to video -

Liked the Benny Hill music at the start...

 

Those guys were a little short on what the British army once called "battlecraft." Is that term still in use?

 

doubt it....don't they call it small unit tactical awareness or some such crap nowadays......

 

Emulating the Einsatzgruppen of the SS:



Russian troops burning Ukraine war dead in mobile incinerators

 

Russian Offensive Campaign ...

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian officials confirmed that Russian forces are using Iranian-provided drones in Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground assaults on settlements south of Bakhmut.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces exchanged heavy artillery fire in Pisky, suggesting that Russian forces are unlikely to have full control of Pisky despite Russian claims.
• Russian forces conducted several limited ground assaults to the north, northwest, and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces accused each other of firing rounds near the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Enerhodar, but ISW cannot independently determine which party is responsible for the incident.
• Russian forces have repeatedly used artillery systems deliberately positioned within the complex to fire on targets across the Dnipro River.
• Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance on Lozove, Kherson Oblast, likely targeting the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River.
• Russian federal subjects are forming new volunteer battalions in Omsk and Samara Oblasts.
• Russian occupation authorities are likely accelerating passportization and rubleization efforts and civilian data collection in occupied territories in preparation for the upcoming pseudo-referenda on the annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory into Russia.
• The Kremlin is continuing to replace Ukrainian collaborators in Russian occupation administrations with Russian officials, likely to prepare for formal Russian governance of annexed areas. . . .

Ukrainian forces likely continued to target Russian ammunition depots and positions in Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported destroying three Russian ammunition depots in Kherson City, and in Prydniprovske and Tokarivka (both situated east of Kherson City along the Dnipro River).[24] Ukrainian Telegram channel Operativnyi ZSU reported that Ukrainian forces have struck two unspecified military infrastructure objects in Oleshky and Nova Kakhovka with high-precision weapons.[25] Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed four Russian S-300 air defense missile systems, and geolocated footage showed Ukrainian missile units destroying Russian armored personnel carriers in Starosillya along the T2207 ground line of communication (GLOCs).[26] Local social media users reported on and published footage suggesting that Russian forces seized Kherson City Clinical Hospital after Ukrainian strikes on a Russian base in Kherson City in mid-July and are unloading military equipment in the building.[27] . . .

 

Russian Offensive Campaign ...

Key Takeaways

• • Russian military leadership continues to experience major turnover, which is likely impacting Russian command and control efforts in Ukraine.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks southwest and southeast of Izyum, east of Siversk, and to the east and south of Bakhmut.
  • Russian forces have likely made incremental gains in settlements on the northwestern and southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City and continued efforts to break Ukrainian defensive lines along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line of contact.
  • Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance east of Mykolaiv City on August 7.
  • Russian forces are forming a new 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade in Orenburg Oblast as part of the 3rd Army Corps. . . .

Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance east of Mykolaiv City on August 7 but did not make any territorial gains. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful assault in the direction of Vasylky-Blahodatne, approximately 45km east of Mykolaiv City.[27] Russian forces continued to intensify aerial reconnaissance and launch airstrikes at Andriivka, Bilohirka, and Velyke Artakove, all situated in the vicinity of the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River.[28] Russian forces also continued to launch cruise missiles and fire rockets from Smerch and Uragan MLRS systems at Mykolaiv City and settlements in its vicinity.[29] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast officials reported that Russian forces fired 60 rockets from Grad MLRS systems at coastal settlements in the Nikopol area.[30] . . .

 

• 
  'American actress Jessica Chastain is in Ukraine today'

 

US Preparing $1 Billion Ukraine Weapons Package. Reuters reports that the Biden administration is preparing a $1 billion weapons package for Ukraine. The package, if signed in its current form, would include High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) munitions, surface-to-air missile ammunition, and M113 armored medical transports. The package would add to the $8.8 billion in aid the US has given Ukraine since Russia’s invasion. It also comes after the Pentagon said it will allow injured Ukrainians to receive medical treatment at a US military hospital near the Ramstein air base in Germany. Reuters

 

Russian men, dying in war, leave many families sad, angry and silent
By Robyn Dixon

 

This from the Telegraph today....

...doesn't seem to mention what duration a short term contract is though or indeed if it includes any training....?

...so luring them in and not paying them...makes sense since they'll probably not last long enough to complain too much

 

Or what might bring the term to a short end . . .

 

As forecast, the Ukraine misadventure is turning Russia into a vassal state of China.
Ukraine War Made Moscow Beijing’s Jr Partner

Alexander Gabuev, Foreign Affairs

The war in Ukraine has cut Russia off from much of the Western world. Barraged by sanctions, denounced in international media, and ostracized from global cultural events, Russians are feeling increasingly alone. But the Kremlin can rely on at least one major pillar of support: China. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine has forced Russia to turn to its fellow Eurasian giant, hat in hand.

In the twentieth century, the Soviet Union viewed China—at least until the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s—as a poorer cousin, a country to be steered and helped along in its fitful progress toward respectability. Decades later, the tables have turned decisively. China has for some time boasted a more robust and dynamic economy, greater technological prowess, and more global political and economic clout than Russia. That asymmetry is destined to become only more pronounced in the coming years as Putin’s regime depends on Beijing for its survival. China will likely gobble up more of Russia’s overall trade. It will become an essential market for Russian exports (notably natural resources) while Russian consumers will increasingly rely on Chinese goods. And it will take advantage of Russia’s predicament to assert the renminbi as both a dominant regional and major international currency.

To keep China happy, Russian leaders will have little choice but to accept unfavorable terms in commercial negotiations, to support Chinese positions in international forums such as the United Nations, and even to curtail Moscow’s relations with other countries, such as India and Vietnam. In the writing of many Western analysts, China and Russia often appear as a pair, two great authoritarian powers seeking to revise the international order. But theirs is not a relationship of equals. The Kremlin’s dependence on China will turn Russia into a useful instrument in a larger game for Zhongnanhai, a tremendous asset in Beijing’s competition with Washington. . . .

 

Ukraine's goal is victory.
With Enough Help, Ukraine Can Win

Stephen Biegun, et al, The Bulwark

Recent Western intelligence estimates of Russian losses in Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine raise serious doubts about the Russian military’s ability to sustain its offensive operations for an extended period. With the possibility that Russian forces cannot keep up their wholly unprovoked and unjustified aggression, and may even experience a collapse, the United States, together with its allies, must provide Ukraine with everything it needs to defeat Putin’s military. Time is of the essence.

There is a difference between thwarting Russia’s maximal objectives and Ukrainian victory. Playing for a tie runs the risk that Russia can accomplish in a war of attrition what it failed to achieve in its initial blitzkrieg: the destruction of a functioning, sovereign, independent Ukraine. Moreover, allowing this fight to devolve into an “endless war” risks endangering the lives of many more Ukrainians and jeopardizing continued popular support in the West for assisting Ukraine.

More than 75,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or injured since Putin ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, according to Rep. Elissa Slotkin, based on a briefing from the U.S. intelligence community. “Over 80 percent of their land forces are bogged down, and they’re tired,” she added. If true, that would be roughly half of all Russian combat forces sent to invade Ukraine.

“I think they’re about to run out of steam,” said British spy chief Richard Moore during the recent Aspen Security Conference, echoing the view of U.S. intelligence that such staggering losses raise questions about Russia’s ability to sustain its campaign. “I think our assessment is that the Russians will increasingly find it difficult to supply manpower [and] material over the next few weeks. They will have to pause in some way and that will give the Ukrainians opportunities to strike back.”. . . .

 

Russian Offensive Campaign ...

Key Takeaways

• Reporting of a likely falsified Russian statement distracts from the real risks of a Russian-caused nuclear disaster at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Russian forces continue to conduct attacks from and store military equipment near the plant’s nuclear reactors, likely to play upon Western fears of a nuclear disaster and degrade Western will to provide additional military support to Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Slovyansk and northeast and southeast of Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian officials postponed reopening the Antonivskyi Bridge after a Ukrainian strike damaged the bridge and nearby construction equipment.
• Russian forces are deploying less-professional occupation forces and increasing pressure on Ukrainian populations in occupied areas. . . .

Russian forces continued focusing efforts on maintaining their current positions and preventing Ukrainian advances along the Southern Axis on August 8.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued shelling civilian and military infrastructure using tank, tube, and rocket artillery and intensified aerial reconnaissance using UAVs along the entire line of contact.[25] Russian forces also conducted airstrikes on Lozove and Andriivka, both on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River, and Olhyne, located along the northern part of the T2207 highway.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces also conducted airstrikes in Prechistivka, Volodymyrivka, Novomykhailivka, and Poltavka.[27]

Russian forces continued to target settlements in Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts with artillery and missiles. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59 cruise missiles at Kamianske and continued shelling Nikopol, Zelendolsk, Marhanets, and Velika Kostromka, Dniprotrovsk Oblast.[28] Russian forces also continued shelling settlements on the outskirts of Mykolaiv City but did not launch any strikes directly on Mykolaiv City.[29] Odesa officials reported that Ukrainian air defense forces shot down four Russian Kalibr missiles fired from the Black Sea.[30]

Ukrainian forces continued targeting Russian military positions and ammunition depots in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that Ukrainian high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) strikes destroyed a “significant amount of” Russian military equipment and manpower concentrations in industrial districts throughout Melitopol at night on August 7-8.[31] Fedorov also noted that Russian forces transferred a significant part of their air defense systems from Melitopol to Kherson during the week of July 31-August 7.[32] Ukrainian officials confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck the Antonivsky and Kakhovka bridges at night on August 7-8.[33] Russian Deputy Head of the Russian Occupation Administration in Kherson Oblast Kirill Stremousov stated that Russian officials will postpone reopening the Antonivskyi bridge, scheduled for August 10, due to the damage to construction equipment near the bridge.[34] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Vladislav Nazarov reported that Ukrainian airstrikes hit two Russian strongholds in the Kherson and Berislav districts and that Ukrainian indirect fire destroyed a Russian ammunition depot in Charivne, approximately 65 km northeast of Kherson City on August 7.[35] . . . .

 

..makes you wonder just how much support will come from China once Xi is presumably re-elected in October? It seems that the hardline narrative and the jingoism (sprouted by China towards Taiwan for example) is just Xi talking tough for a domestic audience in order to underline his "anti-western" credentials. I guess this narrative works in the short term in the hope of the CCP re-affirming him supremacy but afterwards...not sure what will happen. My take is that he will back off and the diplomatic noises will go back to "normal" and that Russia will become less of a talking point for him/them. I can't see such vocal (not that its been that vocal) support from China carrying on much after Xi is re-affirmed...dunno...?