The Alternative Ukraine Thread

My god, the more wrong you are the more confident you get. This is #521:

In other words, totally non responsive. On the other hand, the good news is that after predicting that Ukraine would kick the Russians out of the pre war Ukrainian territory by the end of 2022 you have now tapered your goals have decided that Ukraine, with chunks of it's territory under Russian control, is "victory."

 

I already cited my #521. It proves my point and refutes you.

 

No it doesn't, and I doubt you can even state what your point is.

 

It has all been explained to you more than once.

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 8, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, January 8. This report discusses the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) attempts to claim that Russian forces responded to the December 31 Ukrainian strike on Russian positions in Makiivka; the Russian MoD’s use of a grievance-and-retaliation framework and the resulting creation of negative feedback loops in the pro-war Russian information space; Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s potential attempts to financially exploit Ukrainian natural resources around Bakhmut; and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense’s (UK MoD) assessment that Russian forces may be preparing for Ukrainian counteroffensive actions along the Zaporizhia and Luhansk oblast frontlines.
Key inflections in ongoing military operations on January 8:

• Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated on January 8 that Russia plans to begin domestic production of Iranian-made drones.[18]
• Russian forces continued counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 8.[19] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 8 that Russian forces transferred several battalions from the Bakhmut area to the Kreminna area.[20]
• Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Cherevaty stated on January 8 that Russian forces do not control Soledar, and other official Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces captured Russian positions near Bakhmut.[21] Prominent Russian milbloggers expressed divergent opinions of the potential for the Russian encirclement of Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut and along the western outskirts of Donetsk City.[22]
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on January 7 that 300 Chechen Akhmat-1 OMON personnel deployed to Ukraine.[23]
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces used incendiary munitions to strike civilian infrastructure in Kherson City overnight on January 7–8.[24]
• Russian forces are continuing to intensify filtration measures to identify partisans in occupied territories. Russian occupation authorities claimed that likely Ukrainian partisans committed sabotage by mining a gas pipeline in Luhansk Oblast on January 8.[25]
• Russian occupation authorities intensified passportization efforts in occupied territories on January 8.[26] . . .

 

I've broken this down for you multiple times and you seem unable to grasp it, still you persisted.

 

“There is nothing more frightful than ignorance in action.”

― Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

 

US Says Russian War on Ukraine Lacks Manpower, Morale. The Pentagon said Friday that Russian war aims of seizing territory in Ukraine remain unchanged. However, the US assesses that the Russian military will struggle to achieve this since it is suffering from manpower shortages and lack of morale. Reuters

 

Indeed!

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 9, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways

• • Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to use reports of Wagner Group success in Soledar to bolster the Wagner Group’s reputation as an effective fighting force.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to open the door for further institutionalized corruption in Russia through domestic legislative manipulations.
  • Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev likely gauged the willingness of the Russian information space for the censorship of figures deemed as pro-Ukrainian sympathizers, garnering some acceptance from the nationalist milblogger community.
  • Russian and Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
  • Ukrainian partisans may be targeting Russian critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in rear areas of Luhansk Oblast.
  • Russian forces conducted ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast frontline and made gains around Soledar and Bakhmut.
  • Russian forces continued to reinforce positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
  • Russian forces continued to construct defensive fortifications and transport military equipment in Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued concerns over a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area.
  • Russian and Ukrainian sources indicated that a second wave of mobilization may be imminent or ongoing. . . .

Ukrainian partisans may be targeting Russian assets along critical ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in rear areas of Luhansk Oblast. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Internal Affairs Ministry stated on January 8 that unidentified actors, presumably Ukrainian partisans, committed an act of sabotage and mined a gas pipeline near the Lutuhyne (20km southwest of Luhansk City along the H21 highway), causing an explosion that left 13,000 people without gas.[22] Local LNR Telegram channels additionally reported the activation of an air siren in Alchevsk (35km west of Luhansk City along the M04 highway) and air defense over Stakhanov (45km west of Luhansk City along the T1317 highway) on January 9.[23] . . . .

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian military assets in southern Ukraine on January 8 and 9. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated that there were explosions at the Hidromash factory in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, and Rogov claimed that Russian air defenses shot down drones over the city.[48] A Russian source claimed that there is evidence that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian ammunition depots in Melitopol.[49] Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to strike Tokmak, Enerhodar, and Mykhailivka, Zaporizhia Oblast.[50] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported explosions in occupied Nova Kakhovka, Oleshky (7km southeast of Kherson City), Hola Prystan (10km southwest of Kherson City), Skadovsk (57km southeast of Kherson City), and Zaliznyi Port (58km southwest of Kherson City), Kherson Oblast on January 8 and 9.[51] . . .

 

Latest war statistics.
https://uawar.net/stats

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 10, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways

• Russian media reported on January 10 that Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin, former commander of the Central Military District and Russian forces in Kharkiv and northern Donetsk oblasts during Russia's significant losses in September 2022, has been appointed Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces.
• The news of Lapin’s appointment is generating further schisms in the already-fragmented pro-war Russian information space.
• Igor Girkin heavily implied that he would support the removal of Russian President Vladimir Putin from office, suggesting that a willingness to reduce self-censorship and directly criticize Putin may be growing among some milbloggers.
• The Ukrainian General Staff deviated from its normal reporting pattern about Russian forces in Belarus and near Ukraine’s northern border on January 10, an indicator of possible Russian preparations for an offensive in northern Ukraine, though ISW assesses this course of action remains unlikely at this time.
• Ukrainian forces continued to make gains along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast frontline and made gains around Soledar but have not captured the settlement, despite false claims.
• The Kremlin continues to deny that Russian authorities are preparing for another wave of partial mobilization.
• Russian occupation authorities are struggling to contain an effective partisan movement in occupied territories. . . .

Ukrainian forces continued to make gains along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 10. The Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies confirmed that Ukrainian troops captured Pidkuichansk, 8km northwest of Svatove, on January 8.[26] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are conducting limited counterattacks near Svatove to regain lost positions in the area.[27] A Russian milblogger reported that Russian troops attacked near Stelmakhivka, 13km northwest of Svatove.[28] Geolocated footage shows a Russian tank from the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District firing on Ukrainian positions west of Ploshchanka and approximately 17km northwest of Kreminna, indicating that Ukrainian troops have advanced closer to R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway.[29] A Russian milblogger also remarked that Russian troops attacked Ukrainian positions in the Ploshchanka area, further confirming that Russian troops have lost ground near Kreminna.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks near Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna) and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[31] . . . .

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 11, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 11 that Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov will take over as theater commander as part of a major reshuffle of the Russian command structure for the war in Ukraine.
• Gerasimov’s appointment is likely intended to support an intended decisive Russian military effort in 2023, likely in the form of resumed Russian offensive operations.
• The elevation of Gerasimov and the Russian MoD over Surovikin, a favorite of Prigozhin and the siloviki faction, is additionally highly likely to have been in part a political decision to reassert the primacy of the Russian MoD in an internal Russian power struggle.
• Gerasimov will likely preside over a disorganized command structure plagued by endemic, persistent, and self-reinforcing failures that he largely set into motion in his initial role before the invasion of Ukraine.
• The Russian defense industrial base’s inability to address munitions shortages will likely hinder the ability of Russian forces to sustain offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in 2023.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated that a renewed Russian offensive operation from Belarus remains highly unlikely.
• Russian forces have not yet fully captured Soledar despite recent Russian advances, and the possible capture of Soledar is unlikely to enable Russian forces to capture Bakhmut.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly issued secret and preemptive pardons to Russian convicts fighting with the Wagner Group in Ukraine, potentially further empowering Wagner to operate with impunity in the theater.
• Russian forces continued limited counterattacks near Svatove as Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna and struck rear areas in Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian claims about Wagner Group and conventional Russian military formations’ operations in the Soledar area likely reflect competing claims over the responsibility for the most recent notable Russian tactical advances in Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast frontline.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces are withdrawing key assets and restructuring logistics networks in southern Ukraine due to Ukrainian strikes.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced a plan to improve the Russian defense industrial base. . . .

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued counteroffensive operations around Kreminna on January 11. A Russian source published footage on January 11 purporting to show Russian forces fighting against a Ukrainian assault in the vicinity of Kreminna.[32] A BARS-13 (Russian Combat Reserve) commander claimed that Ukrainian forces have probed Russian defenses in the Kreminna area for the past month, but that Russian artillery units have prevented larger Ukrainian formations from conducting counteroffensive operations in the area.[33] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces have begun to deploy more experienced military personnel, rather than more mobilized personnel, to fight in the Kreminna area due to fears that Russian forces may lose the settlement.[34] Geolocated Russian drone footage posted on January 11 shows Ukrainian forces in forests closer to Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[35] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Kuzmyne (2km southwest of Kreminna) and Hryhorivka (11km south of Kreminna).[36] The BARS-13 commander claimed that Ukrainian forces are particularly active near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and plan to cut off Kreminna by surrounding it from the south, although ISW does not make assessments about specific Ukrainian operations.[37]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian rear areas in Luhansk Oblast on January 11. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian rear areas near Chornukhyne (65km northeast of Donetsk City) and Zolote (43km southeast of Kreminna) in Luhansk Oblast with HIMARS rockets.[38] . . . .

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces are withdrawing key assets and restructuring logistics networks in southern Ukraine due to Ukrainian strikes. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated on January 11 that Russian forces withdrew Shahed-136 drone launch points from occupied Kherson Oblast to Crimea and Krasnodar Krai and suggested Ukrainian forces have struck Russian drone training centers in southern Ukraine.[53] Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian forces previously intended to establish Melitopol as a logistics hub to move forces and equipment to the front lines, likely to compensate for the diminished capacity of the Kerch Strait Bridge, but instead now use the city as a center for destroyed equipment and personnel casualties.[54] Fedorov stated that Russian forces are using local social infrastructure as makeshift morgues and hospitals across Zaporizhia Oblast and transported over 200 dead from Tokmak to Russia, and full rail cars of destroyed equipment from Melitopol to Crimea, suggesting that existing infrastructure is not sufficient for Russian forces to process casualties and damaged equipment.[55] Fedorov stated that Russian forces in rear Mykhailivka are terrified that they "will be sent to be slaughtered" in Vasylivka.[56] . . . .

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 12, 2023

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways

• Russian forces have likely captured Soledar on January 11, but this small-scale victory is unlikely to presage an imminent encirclement of Bakhmut.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin likely seeks scapegoats for the Russian defense industry base’s struggle to address equipment and technological challenges, and retains unrealistic expectations of Russian capacity to rapidly replace losses.
• Ukrainian intelligence confirmed that senior Russian military leadership is preparing for significant military reforms in the coming year, though ISW continues to assess Russia will struggle to quickly—if at all—implement planned reforms.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and west of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces continued defensive operations on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.
• Russian officials and occupation authorities may be preparing for the mass deportation of Ukrainian citizens from occupied territories to the Russian Federation.
• Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense Andrei Kartapolov announced that Russian military recruitment offices may increase the age of eligibility for conscription as early as this spring’s conscription cycle.
• Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, Oleg Salyukov (who was appointed as one of Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov’s three “deputies” as theater commander in Ukraine), arrived in Belarus to take control of combat coordination exercises for the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV). . . .

Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Stelmakhivka (16km west of Svatove).[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups within 44km northwest of Svatove near Kyslivka, Vilshana, Tabaivka, Krokhmalne, and Pershotravneve in Kharkiv Oblast.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Kreminna, which may indicate that Ukrainian forces have made further advances towards the settlement.[21] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that heavy fighting continued on the approaches to Kreminna over the last two days and that Russian forces have transferred elements of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) to the vulnerable Kreminna sector of the front line.[22] The UK MoD suggested that Russian commanders are attempting to deploy VDV units in their doctrinal role as an elite rapid reaction force, instead of the past Russian practice in Kherson Oblast of deploying these formations as long-term, ground-holding forces.[23] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Ukrainian forces improved their tactical positions near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and are preventing Russian forces from attacking the settlement.[24] . . .

Russian soldiers continue to complain about poor living conditions and mistreatment on the front. A video published on January 11 shows Russian troops from the 10th company of the 3rd battalion of the 392nd Motorized Rifle Regiment appealing to military leadership concerning their unlivable conditions and “lawlessness” at the front.[50] The video shows troops trying to break through the ice in frozen trenches, admitting to stealing funds to supply themselves with equipment, and complaining that they have been “living like this for 11 months.”[51] . . .

 

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/05/ukraine-military-f-16-aircraft/674022/

This is an excellent article and I recommend that members here it. I posted the three “excuses” noted by the author. It is a long article but we’ll worth reading.


America’s Unconvincing Reasons for Denying F-16s to Ukraine

Before giving Kyiv the weapons that it needs, the U.S. always works through a list of excuses.

By Phillips Payson O’Brien and Edward Stringer



“Before each decision to arm Ukraine with a new category of powerful arms, NATO partners progress through three stages of denial.


“First comes an outright dismissal of the country’s ability to effectively deploy the weapons in question against Russian invaders. Ukraine could never use these—the argument has been applied to multiple rocket-launch systems, anti-aircraft systems, and sophisticated tanks—because they are just too complex. “

“Next comes a qualified dismissal. Ukrainian forces might be able to use these systems, but equipping and training them would take far too long. “


“Then comes a desperate third stage. Yes, Ukraine can use these weapons, which could make a big difference in the war, but we worry about how Russia or China might respond. “ This view, though not always publicly voiced, almost certainly is the real reason the United States and other Western powers are holding back some arms.”

 

Reason Number 4: Every type of sophisticated weapons system we send to Ukraine will eventually wind up in the hands of the Russians and Chinese where they will be studied and examined so methods will be devised to both counter them and improve their own weapons.

 

We are not and will not send our most technically advanced weapons. Example the Abrams tanks we will send or maybe send sometime in the future will be the watered down version of the Abrams.

 

Ukraine strikes Russian forces in Luhansk before expected counteroffensive


NPR
Latest on Ukraine: Zelenskyy made a spring diplomatic offensive in Europe (May 15)

 

Leaders of wider Europe unite against Russia at rare pan-continental summit

 

I think the Ukrainians are being trained on the Abrams right now in Germany, but you seem to be conceding that anything we send will eventually wind up in Russian or Chinese hands, it just won't be our most sophisticated versions. OK.

 

No I am not conceding any such thing. Read what I wrote-

“ We are not and will not send our most technically advanced weapons. Example the Abrams tanks we will send or maybe send sometime in the future will be the watered down version of the Abrams.”. That statement says we are taking steps to prevent our most safisticated tech from any enemy. Those are the steps we have been taking

 

More Muscovite nonsense exposed.

World
The Daily Beast
Humiliation for Putin’s ‘Unstoppable’ Superweapons Blasted Out of Sky by U.S. Defense System

 

Yes, the steps we are taking are not sending them. I'm not sure what you are disagreeing with.

 

". . . . Continued Russian military underperformance in Ukraine and the insistent use of World War II analogies raise the prospect that the government will be seen as besmirching the memory of the Great Victory. It would be a bittersweet irony if the Kremlin’s own exploitation of the Great Patriotic War cult led to a dent in the state’s stranglehold over historical narrative and, by extension, narratives of Russia’s war on Ukraine. It is an axiom that revolutions eat themselves, but cults can be cannibalistic too."
The Great Patriotic Special Military Operation

The Moscow Times
https://www.themoscowtimes.com › Opinion



May 8, 2023 — According to this narrative, Russia is fighting for the legacy of World War II by defeating fascism once more. While the Kremlin quietly dropped ...

 

According to one of the NATO officers who provided staff support for counterattacks on the flanks of the Bakhmut group on May 12, Ukraine suffered one of the biggest losses since 2014 - 1,725 people were killed.

The strikes of the 2nd Azov Brigade on the southern flank and two mechanized brigades and one motorized rifle battalion on the northern flank were stopped, and the losses amounted to one regiment.

Russian Russian troops' rapid withdrawal to the plain and the shelling of Russian tanks, artillery and Russian aviation on the defense line prepared at high altitudes led to heavy losses.

A large number of foreign mercenaries and far-right groups are stuck in Bakhmut. The APU has been trying for several days to ease the pressure on the group so that it can be withdrawn, but Russia is nullifying these attempts with massive bombing.